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1. In your opinion, what are the main challenges facing the 
conventional weapons destruction (CWD) and humanitar-
ian mine action (HMA) community today (funding, stra-
tegic planning, governance, development approaches, 
staffing, political interference, networking of organiza-
tions within uncertain political and external environ-
ments, etc.); how are they typically overcome?
As we enter our third decade of work, the mine action sector 
faces two challenges: first, we need to fulfill the promise to the 
millions of forgotten people who continue to live in fear from 
explosive remnants of war (ERW). Secondly, we must adapt to 
the current and future humanitarian requirements caused by 
war; far more people are being harmed by this second category. 
Legacy contamination. Landmines remain as dangerous as 
ever to the 60 million people affected by them worldwide, restrict-
ing access to land, livelihoods, and endangering the lives of those 
who live nearby. Despite this continued danger, funding of leg-
acy mine action programs remains a challenge. We must respect 
competing humanitarian priorities, without allowing donor fa-
tigue, or diminishing foreign aid budgets to damage our work. 
The Landmine Free 2025 (http://landminefree2025.org) 
campaign seeks to change this narrative and reinvigorate sup-
port to achieve completion in as many places as possible by 
2025. Completion is possible and achievable with the right fi-
nancial and political commitment from both donor and af-
fected states, but will take innovative thinking and agility to 
achieve. As such, we are exploring innovative solutions that 
have been developed in other sectors, such as alternative fund-
ing mechanisms and social financing that may provide addi-
tional support to mine action. 
Improvised explosive devices (IED). In addition to legacy 
mine problems, the mine action sector is also confronting new 
contamination in many regions. IEDs are not new, and in the 
majority of cases, they fall under the globally agreed defini-
tion of landmines. However, the new use of these weapons and 
massive scale of IED contamination in the Middle East and 
other regions, leading to a considerable increase in casualties, 
give reason to develop new techniques, training, and methods 
to meet the evolving nature of modern landmines. 
Urban clearance. Linked to the proliferation of improvised 
mines and the changing nature of warfare is the require-
ment for large-scale, urban rubble clearance and reconstruc-
tion. The physical challenge of destroyed buildings, reinforced 
concrete, and booby-trapping create significant technical 
challenges on a daunting scale for mine clearance operators. 
HALO has begun to adapt to meet these challenges by devel-
oping new survey techniques for urban areas. We are adapting 
machines used for urban clearance in Afghanistan and other 
contexts, and developing pilot projects in Afghanistan to trial 
new techniques for clearance.
Neutral humanitarian space. The wars of the 21st century 
are more likely to take place in urban populated areas, where 
the lines between peace and formal war, and between civilian 
and combatant are increasingly fluid. With numerous non-
state actors in communities, negotiating access becomes an 
ongoing process rather than a precursor to engagement. HMA 
operators must be flexible and nimble to be able to adapt, and 
change areas of operation swiftly in line with changing con-
ditions, while protecting the safety of staff and communities.
2. Transitioning from the British Army to an international non-
governmental organization (NGO), how did your past work 
prepare you for The HALO Trust, what lessons learned have 
been the most valuable for you? 
During my time as a soldier I fought in Northern Ireland, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan and served in many other places. 
MAJOR GENERAL J. M. COWAN, CBE  DSO
James Cowan is CEO of The HALO Trust (HALO), a leading NGO clearing the debris of 
war with over 8,500 staff in 24 countries. At a time of unprecedented, man-made humani-
tarian crises, HALO’s work has never been more important.
James was a soldier for 30 years, serving in Germany, Northern Ireland, Africa, Hong 
Kong, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He commanded his regiment, The Black Watch, in Iraq in 2004 
during fighting in Basra and subsequently around Fallujah. He was back in Iraq in 2006–
2007, again in Basra. He took command of Task Force Helmand and served in Afghanistan 
during 2009–2010. He was subsequently Head of Counter Terrorism in the British Ministry 
of Defence and led the planning for the 2012 Olympics military security operation. His last 
job in the British Army was as General Officer Commanding the 3rd (U.K.) Division.
James left the British Army in 2015 to become CEO of HALO. He read modern history at Oxford and took a Masters of 
Philosophy at Cambridge and has a long-standing interest in military history and the Napoleonic Wars. He is married to 
Minnie with three children and lives in Dorset, United Kingdom.
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 I began my service in Berlin, protecting it from the Soviets—
the war that, thankfully, never was.  
I’ve learnt several lessons from that experience:
• First, the British Army of 1989 was geared for a conven-
tional fight against the Warsaw Pact. Now it has changed 
out of all recognition to deal with the much more com-
plex threats of terrorism and cyber warfare, while still 
being able to protect the UK against a resurgent Russia. 
There are parallels with mine action, which still has a leg-
acy threat to clear, but I don’t think the sector has dared 
to change at the same pace, and it needs to catch up.
• Second, the British Army teaches leadership—I see a sec-
tor afflicted by management speak. I’d like to see more 
leadership and a clearer sense of direction.
• And third, the British Army teaches Mission Command, 
by which it means trusting those who can be trusted. 
Mine action could usefully do the same.
3. During your career in the military, how do you feel explo-
sive hazards clearance has evolved over the years?
War is, at its heart, an attempt to out-maneuver your enemy. 
To achieve this, you need to move without friction, breaching 
natural and man-made obstacles. Conversely, you must limit 
your enemy’s capacity to maneuver by creating obstacles. In 
the 1980s, clearing and laying landmines played a major part 
in this, but as war became more three-dimensional, the use of 
landmines became less relevant—helicopters, insurgents, and 
cyber warriors aren’t very worried by landmines. Now it is the 
IED that dominates and, along with the proliferation of small 
arms, the mine action sector needs to reinvent itself to coun-
ter these two threats.
4. Going forward, what opportunities do you see for HALO 
and other HMA NGOs, and how well-prepared do you 
think the wider HMA/CWD community is for the future?
We need to be better at forecasting and responding to the 
world of 2049, not 1989. In my view, growing populations, 
urbanization, competition for land, climate change, bio- 
diversity, non-state conflict, and threats to the rules-based 
international order will predominate. Mine action is good at 
dealing with the world as it was in 1989 or in 1997 when the 
Ottawa Treaty was signed, but that is not a recipe for future 
success. We are in danger of entering our anecdotage, addict-
ed to the good old days—it’s time to make space for younger, 
fresher thinking.
While only 10 percent of countries are currently on track 
to meet their completion deadlines, we are also presented 
with a great opportunity to increase the completion rate and 
make life better for 60 million people. With a bit of innovative 
thinking and increased political engagement from donors and 
affected countries mines could be eradicated. 
As we approach completion of clearance in many coun-
tries around the world, the HMA community must be aware 
of the consequences of our exit. As humanitarian organiza-
tions, we bear responsibility for the impact of our presence or 
lack thereof on our staff and the communities where we work. 
We must therefore pay careful attention to how we draw down 
operations as we approach country completion or transfer 
over to national authorities. It also means there is an oppor-
tunity to do this correctly. This means exploring partnerships 
with other NGOs, which might be able to provide livelihood 
supports or training. It also means ensuring that there is suf-
ficient national capacity to deal with any residual contamina-
tion, which may be discovered in the future. 
The HMA community faces a challenge that every humani-
tarian sector wishes to face. Within the next decade, we expect 
that large-scale mine clearance operations will be reduced in 
many countries, in all but a handful of countries such as those 
in the Middle East. 
The HMA community thus faces a dilemma and an oppor-
tunity. Should we pivot and expand the scope of our opera-
tions where we can bring value, or should we slowly reduce in 
size as we accomplish our goal of a landmine free world? To 
achieve your mission is the ultimate aim of every humanitari-
an organization. Nevertheless, to eclipse would do a disservice 
to significant and transferable skills of the HMA sector and 
deep knowledge of local needs and context. HALO’s mission 
is to “protect lives and restore livelihoods for those threat-
ened by conflict.” While the nature of the threat may change 
as conflicts evolve, HALO’s mission will remain the same. We 
believe our sector has value to add in supporting countries 
post-conflict and therefore could successfully diversify into 
areas beyond our traditional mine action and conventional 
weapons work.  
5. While working in HMA, what experience, lesson, or event 
has impacted you in your role as CEO the most? (This 
could be a travel experience, people met/worked with, 
challenge, etc.)
 Last year, HALO suffered a mine accident in Nagorno- 
Karabakh that killed three, badly wounded one, and harmed 
a fifth person. It reminded me of the extraordinary commit-
ment that people in HALO and mine action more broadly 
make to this wonderful humanitarian cause. We could not do 
our work without them and I salute the sacrifice and endeavor 
of the amazing men and women who, day after day, go out to 
make the world a safer place. 
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1. In your opinion, what are the opportunities and chal-
lenges to ensure that conventional weapons destruction 
(CWD) and humanitarian mine action (HMA) are gender 
and diversity-responsive (funding, strategic planning, 
governance, development approaches, staffing, political 
interference, networking of organizations within uncer-
tain political and external environments, etc.); and how 
can the international community address these?
In the ten years I have been involved in CWD and HMA, I 
think the main challenges for gender and diversity to be taken 
seriously have been
• the lack of understanding of gender and diversity and 
their relevance in the mine action context.
• the lack of political will and commitment of manage-
ment to mainstream gender and diversity in programs 
and projects.
• the limited capacity to mainstream gender and diversity 
in certain contexts. 
• funding restrictions (for example, donor procedures not 
allowing to pay for staff on maternity leave) and lack of 
gender budgeting.
Since I started working with the GMAP in 2009, I have also 
seen progress in all these areas, and there is increasing recogni-
tion in the sector of the importance of mainstreaming gender 
and diversity in order to deliver more inclusive, effective, and 
efficient activities. 
It has become clear that one size does not fit all, and that 
gender and diversity need to be considered in all aspects of 
mine action, from strategic planning to recruitment policies 
and practices, all the way to uniforms and personal protec-
tive equipment.
In my opinion there is currently tremendous momentum to 
ensure that gender and diversity are systematically taken into 
account in CWD and HMA, and to realize the sector’s poten-
tial to contribute to gender equality, inclusion, and the empow-
erment of women and girls.
The Women, Peace and Security agenda and the Sustainable 
Development Goals constitute an important international 
framework for gender-responsive mine action. Most opera-
tors have realized the importance of gender and diversity for 
their operations and have policies/strategies and good practic-
es in place. While ensuring that interventions are gender and 
diversity sensitive—i.e., take into account the different needs, 
priorities, and capabilities of women, girls, boys, and men—is 
currently considered to be the very minimum, many operators 
are now also interested in the transformative impact that mine 
action can have in promoting more gender equality and em-
powerment of women.
Several donors support and even require mine action in-
terventions to be at a minimum gender sensitive, while some 
go beyond and have feminist foreign and aid policy that re-
quire transformative actions. National mine action author-
ities are requesting support to develop their capacity on 
gender and diversity and adopt strategies and standards that 
reflect best practices.
The United Nations has a new mine action strategy with an 
even stronger focus on gender and will soon launch revised 
Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes. The GICHD 
has adopted a new strategy in which one of the four strategic 
goals is “Gender equality and inclusion are achieved and wom-
en and girls are empowered.” GMAP was integrated into the 
GICHD in March this year to translate this commitment into 
tangible support and services for the CWD and HMA sector 
and to enable a multiplier effect by mainstreaming gender and 
diversity in all the knowledge generated and disseminated by 
the GICHD.
ARIANNA CALZA BINI
Arianna Calza Bini was the Director of the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) 
from 2009 to 2019. She recently joined the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) as Head of Division, following the integration of GMAP into the GICHD 
as a new division. Previously she worked as Programme Manager and Gender Advisor 
at the EU Delegation to Brazil, Gender and Poverty Officer for UNDP in El Salvador; and 
Junior Expert and Gender Focal Point at the EU Delegation to Central America in Costa 
Rica. She holds a Masters of Philosophy in Development Studies from the Institute of 
Development Studies, Sussex, United Kingdom, and an advanced university degree in 
economics from the University of Rome, Italy.
gender &
mine
action
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2. How has your prior professional experience prepared 
you for being Director of GMAP and what lessons learned 
have been the most valuable for you? 
Growing up in an Italian-Swedish family, I always had in-
terest and curiosity for other cultures, different ideas, and 
perspectives. I also never felt entirely part of just one culture, 
as even at home there would always be differing opinions and 
practices. As a girl and young woman growing up in Italy, I 
experienced street harassment, sexual harassment, and sex-
ism, and always felt very uncomfortable and upset about it. It 
took me some time and studies to be able to articulate how 
very wrong those “normalized” behaviors were and to react 
to them.
Undoubtedly my upbringing influenced my study choices 
towards international economics and development. During 
my studies I was confronted with some of the deep inequali-
ties and injustices of this world and the ones that came clos-
er to my heart were the ones between the Global North and 
the Global South (for lack of a better definition), and those 
between men and women. I decided to pursue a career in 
international cooperation and development and ended up 
spending 10 years in the Latin American region working 
for the European Union and United Nations Development 
Programme with a strong focus on gender.
One of the first lessons I learned as a young professional and 
as a woman was how to be heard and valued by colleagues, su-
pervisors, and counterparts. Working in multicultural envi-
ronments, I always tried to listen and show respect for other 
people’s beliefs and opinions while promoting change. It was 
important to learn how to balance openness and flexibility 
with integrity, especially when promoting women’s rights and 
gender equality.
Other important and useful lessons were how to engage 
with diverse stakeholders towards a common goal, and how 
bureaucracy and control are necessary but can be too heavy, 
to the point they hinder the delivery of actual results.
Family reasons took me back to Europe and specifically 
to Switzerland where, after having a daughter, I decided to 
engage in the intersection between the humanitarian sector 
and the promotion of gender equality. The Gender and Mine 
Action Programme offered me the ideal opportunity to do 
this and what was supposed to be a maternity cover of a few 
months in 2009 ended up being a 10-year endeavor in the 
HMA sector.
3. As a strong, female leader involved in the NGO sector, 
what are the most significant barriers you have faced?
I feel very lucky and privileged as I have mostly been re-
spected and valued in my professional career. It has not al-
ways been easy and smooth, but I have managed to develop 
respectful, collaborative, and productive relationships with 
colleagues, partners, and authorities throughout my life.
When I started with GMAP in 2009, coming from the 
broader development sector, I was new to HMA and it took me 
some time to really understand and familiarize myself with all 
areas and technicalities of the sector, and to earn credibility. 
I was confronted with a relatively small community that was 
highly technical, male-dominated with a high proportion of 
military or former military people, where everybody seemed 
to know each other and many would make it clear that what 
counted for them was the technical, specialized knowledge 
and the ones holding it (themselves). 
Working on what is sometimes described as the “soft” side 
of mine action, which is actually the side that focuses on peo-
ple, I noticed a quite remarkable difference between the way 
colleagues from civil society and advocacy organizations (the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines and others) wel-
comed me, and the initial condescendence and in some cas-
es reluctance of colleagues involved in the more operational 
and technical side of mine action (mostly men) to engage with 
GMAP and me personally. Gender was not really a topic most 
of the sector valued or was even interested in at the time.
The representation of women in the sector has increased in 
the last ten years, but not significantly. The fact that it still is 
highly male-dominated means that I often find myself in situ-
ations where I am one of the few women present, advocating 
for the need to ensure the participation and inclusion of wom-
en and other underrepresented groups in mine action pro-
grams and forums.
I also think that there still is a tendency to highlight wom-
en in mine action as exceptional, and while they might well be 
great, doing so reinforces the view that they are an exception, 
rather than fully belonging in the sector in their own right, 
with their strengths and weaknesses.
4. While working in HMA, what experience, lesson, or event 
has impacted you in your role as Director the most? (This 
could be a travel experience, people met/worked with, 
challenge, etc.)
The one thing that has affected me the most is travelling to 
mine-affected areas and meeting the people who suffer from 
landmines and ERW contamination in their communities, 
the women, girls, boys and men who are survivors and indi-
rect victims of this awful and indiscriminate scourge. Seeing 
their resilience and strength has been truly inspiring. At the 
same time, realizing how vulnerable and helpless they can be 
in certain situations is a constant motivation to work towards 
improving victim assistance and reducing the risk from ex-
plosive ordnance in a gender and diversity inclusive and 
equal manner. 
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1. In your opinion, what are the main humanitarian mine ac-
tion (HMA) and conventional weapons destruction (CWD) 
obstacles faced by organizations working in HMA, specifi-
cally the GICHD?
Strong national commitment, a solid implementation architecture 
coupled to efficient operations, and international solidarity remain 
the three key factors of successful mine action work at a national level. 
Experience shows that, once in place, these factors go a long way in en-
suring the timely fulfillment of treaty obligations and the attainment 
of national completion targets. In some parts of the world, however, we 
are witnessing a changing working environment. Mine action actors are 
called upon to work closer to conflicts due to their prolonged nature and 
pressing humanitarian needs, including in relation to the return home 
of displaced persons. These conflicts represent complex operational con-
texts by virtue of their urban nature, the multiplicity of actors and risks, 
and the unprecedented large-scale use of improvised explosive devic-
es (IED), which often function like mines. Mine action actors wishing 
to operate there face challenges pertaining to the necessary operational 
space and the technical complexity of improvised devices.
On the former issue, a reflection in the sector is on-going regard-
ing the when and how to negotiate humanitarian access. Institutional 
mandates entrusted to regional or international organizations can 
sometimes offer entry points in that regard, as exemplified by the frame-
work provided by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) in Ukraine. On the latter, the current revision of the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) is paramount and will 
provide much needed guidance on the search and disposal of IEDs in 
urban settings. 
Turmoil and conflict have also affected the functioning of national 
mine action programs. In some instances, national capacities are yet to 
be built. This is a significant challenge, not least for the GICHD, which 
usually works with established national institutions. The mine action 
sector has been very innovative in supporting local partners in difficult 
circumstances, such as through remote training. 
With respect to the need for a solid implementation architecture 
and efficient operations, let me emphasize the key role of internation-
al and national standards in accelerating treaty implementation. The 
IMAS play a decisive role in turning the obligations enshrined in the 
conventions into reality in the field—as proven again and again in the 
20 years since their establishment. It will be important to continue to 
make sure that they remain in sync with operational realities in the field.
Finally, on international solidarity: the 2025 and 2030 aspiration-
al goals agreed upon at Maputo (3rd Review Conference (RC) of the 
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)) in 2014 and Geneva 
(6th Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(CCM)) in 2016, respectively, were important levers to renew the co-
operation between affected States, donor States, and other stakehold-
ers. Yet, international funding remains under strain, particularly with 
regard to so-called legacy contamination. The upcoming 4th RC of the 
APMBC (Oslo, November 2019) is a welcome opportunity to reaffirm 
once again our commitment to achieving mine-free status in all affected 
countries around the world within the next few years and to emphasize 
the essential enabling role mine action plays with respect to humanitari-
an action, peace and security, and sustainable development. Reaffirming 
that mine action is more than mine action and showcasing what that 
means concretely will help, I am convinced, to re-energize and broaden 
its support base. 
You will agree that the three factors of success mentioned earlier are 
as much important to mine action as they are to ammunition manage-
ment. During many years, much of our focus in ammunition manage-
ment used to be on short-term interventions and physical improvements 
of ammunition storage sites. This approach can prevent a disaster but 
has been challenged by the observed lack of lasting change in the ca-
pacities of and commitment by national partners. In response, inter-
national partners have started to adopt a comprehensive and gradual 
approach to institutional, legislative, and operational changes in am-
munition management practices. In parallel, a strengthened application 
of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) is be-
ing pursued. Encouragingly, cooperation and funding for ammunition 
management have gone up significantly in recent times. 
2. How have your roles as an ambassador and a diplomat prepared 
you for being Director of the GICHD, and what lessons learned 
have been the most valuable for you?  
Well, I do not know that my diplomatic career so far was necessar-
ily meant to prepare me for my current position. But more seriously, it 
definitely strengthened my personal interest in all things humanitarian 
AMBASSADOR STEFANO TOSCANO
Ambassador Stefano Toscano has been the Director of the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) since January 2014, bringing extensive experience in multi-
lateral diplomacy and human security affairs following a rich career with the Swiss Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. As diplomatic collaborator in Berne (1998–2002), Ambassador Toscano grew 
familiar with the importance and potential of the humanitarian disarmament agenda and estab-
lished close contacts with actors working on small arms issues. He participated in the discus-
sions and work that led to the creation of the Small Arms Survey in 1999. As a Counselor at the 
Swiss Mission to the United Nations in New York (2002–2006), he was in charge of humanitari-
an, environmental, and migration affairs before serving as Vice Chairman of the 2nd Committee 
of the U.N. General Assembly. After returning to Switzerland in 2006, Mr. Toscano was Head 
of Section, Humanitarian Policy and Migration, at the Human Security Division of the Political 
Directorate, then Deputy Head of Division. In the-three-and-a-half years before joining the GICHD, he was the Deputy Chief of 
Mission at the Swiss Embassy in Cairo. Ambassador Toscano holds a Ph.D. in natural science from the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology in Zurich and a master’s degree in international relations from the University of San Diego.
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and disarmament, including the correlation between the two, enhanced 
my savoir faire with respect to multilateral diplomacy, and showed me 
first hand, in the frame of the small arms/light weapons (SA/LW) pro-
cess leading to the UN SA/LW Conference in 2001 that negotiated the 
Program of Action to Combat Illicit Trafficking in SA/LW, how multi-
stakeholder approaches can make a real difference both at the norma-
tive and field levels. All this is fully relevant to my current position as 
Director of a Centre dedicated to mine action and ammunition man-
agement from a humanitarian perspective and at both multilateral and 
field levels.
As a diplomat, I often tried and worked based on the belief that the 
combination of innovative ideas, strong partnerships, and some mon-
ey can go a surprisingly long way to address apparently intractable is-
sues. That belief is also guiding me in my current position, as we at the 
GICHD work with our partners to promote the sector-wide develop-
ment and application of innovative concepts, methods and tools, for 
example in the field of information management.
3. How do you feel the field of HMA has evolved since you became 
director?
The field of mine action has evolved significantly in recent years. 
First of all, the wide recognition and year-long application of the 
land-release approach has transformed the underpinning narrative 
in mine action into one aimed at a progressive, evidence-based reduc-
tion of risks. This represents a fundamental “cultural” change towards 
a risk-reduction approach, a change that is fully reflected in the new 
strategy of the GICHD. 
A risk-reduction approach goes hand in hand with an increased ac-
knowledgement of the need timely to plan for the long-term manage-
ment of residual risks—that is of those risks that we anticipate might 
still exist, but for which no evidence has emerged yet. We have wit-
nessed important developments in this regard recently, especial-
ly in Southeast Asia. Several mine action strategies, for instance of 
Cambodia and Sri Lanka, now explicitly recognize such timely plan-
ning as a priority, and concrete action is taking place—the establish-
ment of adequate legal, institutional, and operational frameworks in 
Vietnam being a case in point. 
Noteworthy is also that mine action is, more than ever, understood 
as an enabler of broader agendas. The Sustainable Development Goals 
narrative to “go more connected” has certainly paved the way for that, 
whilst Colombia illustrated recently the positive contribution that 
mine action can make to peace processes. We now realize fully that be-
ing part of larger agendas is key for the sustainability and impact of our 
work and for others to benefit from what we have to offer. 
Finally, I would mention the stronger orientation on results. As a 
sector, we now seek to achieve and demonstrate lasting change for what 
we do in terms of improved lives and livelihoods. This also responds 
to the wish of many mine action stakeholders for more accountability 
and transparency. In this same spirit, we have moved into a culture of 
“learning and adapting,” whereby we monitor, evaluate, and adapt our 
approaches constantly. 
4. Going forward, what opportunities do you see for the 
GICHD to help the wider HMA/CWD community moving into 
the future?
In the development of our new strategy 2019–2022, we assessed 
extensively how the GICHD can best serve its partners in the future. 
Building on our 20-year experience in support of mine action, we be-
lieve we are well placed to promote an approach that aims to reduce 
risks more broadly. This is why our underlying narrative has changed 
from humanitarian demining to the broader reduction of risks from 
explosive ordnance.
A significant element of it will be to help fill gaps in the safe and se-
cure management of ammunition. Our experience in IMAS develop-
ment, outreach, and implementation will be put to good use towards a 
strengthened application of the IATG. The Ammunition Management 
Advisory Team, newly established within the GICHD together with the 
UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, will be a key resource to that effect. 
In light of the remaining and new contamination, the need for effi-
cient and effective mine action is undiminished. The GICHD’s core task 
to help develop and support nationally-owned, sustainable capacities 
remains in high demand and will continue to represent a key contribu-
tion of ours in the coming years. That said, we aim to enhance the sus-
tainability of our support through an increased country focus. 
I also see a continued role for the GICHD to help adapt the sector’s 
concepts, methods, tools, and standards to the new realities in the field. 
Think about operating in urban settings or dealing with more complex 
improvised devices. It is in the GICHD’s DNA to provide guidance 
on such pressing issues. At the same time, we will also lead on mak-
ing established mine action concepts, methods, and tools useful for 
broader undertakings. The development of the Enterprise Geographic 
Information System (EGIS) for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission 
(SMM) to Ukraine is a case in point. Fact-finding and reporting belong 
to the SMM’s tasks. The EGIS will facilitate this by using state-of-the 
art reporting and mapping tools—well known in the mine actor sec-
tor—to improve the flow of information between SMM’s field teams 
and its headquarters.
Furthermore, we see an increasing need for platforms for dialogue 
and cooperation, for example in support of the country-focused ap-
proaches currently fostered under the APMBC and CCM. Regional and 
bilateral exchanges among affected countries also still yield untapped 
potential. This is a role that we are committed to offering for the ben-
efit of our partners. 
Finally, through the recent integration of the Gender and Mine 
Action Programme into the GICHD, we will be able to multiply our ef-
forts to turn the gender and diversity agenda into a reality in the field. 
Working to see more women in mine action, involved in building solu-
tions, and to help talented women and youth with diverse backgrounds 
grow in their careers, will be part of it.
5. While working in HMA, what experience, lesson, or event has im-
pacted you in your role as Director the most?
My first mission as Director of the GICHD, two months into the job, 
was to Cambodia, Vietnam, and Lao PDR. What I saw there—the im-
pact landmines and cluster munitions have had and were still having 
on the lives of so many people, the dedication of the mine action com-
munity to address these challenges professionally and speedily, and the 
positive role the GICHD was playing in supporting these efforts—all 
this is still with me today and represents a formidable source of moti-
vation. What I also appreciate much is the common sense of purpose, 
collaboration, and solidarity that characterizes the mine action sec-
tor—sort of a victory of cooperation over competition for the benefit of 
a good cause. This is far from obvious and very inspiring. 
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INTERVIEWS WITH  HMA  DIRECTORS
1. In your opinion, what are the main conventional weapons 
destruction (CWD) and humanitarian mine action (HMA) 
obstacles faced by non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) operating in the Pacific (funding, strategic planning, 
governance, development approaches, staffing, political 
interference, networking of organizations within uncer-
tain political and external environments, etc.); how are 
they typically overcome?
The Pacific encompasses a vast amount of area and a number 
of diverse HMA challenges. Golden West operations current-
ly engages the Solomon Islands, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, all with very different needs 
and challenges. Funding is always a challenge and government 
donors are subject to short-term budgets in the face of long-
term requirements and commitments needed to build capac-
ity to overcome HMA challenges. Donor fatigue is a reality and 
can have substantial impacts to organizational strategic plan-
ning, especially when you must rely on limited donors. 
Golden West is different from many other Pacific HMA 
NGOs, who focus on clearance of landmines or unexplod-
ed ordnance (UXO). Golden West does not generally con-
duct clearances, but concentrates on technology and training 
that builds long-term capacity. Golden West operates the 
Explosive Harvesting Program, funded by the Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department 
of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), 
and in partnership with Cambodia’s Mine Action Center 
(CMAC), recycling suitable munitions and creating explosive 
charges used by all clearance NGOs in Cambodia to destroy 
landmines and UXO.   
The extended nature of Golden West training engagements 
requires cooperation from national authorities and recogni-
tion of the value added by the capacity we provide. Asian cul-
tural values are often at odds to a quick approach, and it can 
take many years to gain trust and willing support.
The customers are also very different, and these differenc-
es have serious implications for how HMA programs evolve. 
In the Solomon Islands, we provide International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) EOD training for the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force. Their EOD teams are now well trained 
and have the skills and capacity to sustain a safe and effective 
program, but working in the Solomon Islands is difficult. The 
remote nature of the islands, the physical conditions of heat, 
rain, mud, and tropical jungles, helps make it a challenge just 
to work there. 
In Vietnam, we work primarily with Vietnamese Provincial 
Military Commands (PMC), building EOD skills support-
ing both emergency responses and battle area clearances. 
Golden West’s PMC IMAS EOD training is focused on build-
ing long-term, sustainable capabilities that can take over when 
proactive clearance is done and Vietnam assumes all explo-
sive remnants of war (ERW) missions. We are now focused on 
making the PMCs capable of safely and effectively managing 
the inevitable residual UXO without assistance. 
2. Transitioning from the U.S. Army to an NGO, how did your 
past work prepare you for Golden West, and what les-
sons learned have been the most valuable for you? 
Many years of military service provided a solid techni-
cal background in ammunition management and EOD. 
When assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
ALLAN VOSBURGH 
Allan Vosburgh is the Chief Executive Officer of the Golden West Humanitarian 
Foundation since 2016. Vosburgh is a retired U.S. Army Colonel and former U.S. Army 
Master Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technician with over 40 years of experi-
ence in munitions stockpile management, explosive safety, EOD, munitions testing, 
weapons of mass destruction, training, technology assessments, and humanitarian 
mine action (HMA). Before retiring from the Army in 2005, Vosburgh served in the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
Conflict) in the Pentagon, where he provided oversight of EOD, HMA technology, and 
Special Operations Ammunition. Other assignments included Ammunition Officer for 
the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations/G-3, Commander, 3rd Ordnance Battalion 
(EOD), and Director of (Ammunition) Materiel Testing at Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana. He served as a Department 
of Army Civilian from 2009 to 2016 as U.S. Army, Pacific, G-4, Chief of Munitions. Vosburgh holds Master of Science de-
grees from both the National Defense University and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He worked as a volunteer with 
Golden West from 2006 to 2016.
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Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), I 
worked closely with Department of Defense Humanitarian 
Demining Research and Development Program (HD R&D) 
at Fort Belvoir, VA. There I had the opportunity to interact 
with a wide variety of HMA NGOs and programs. The excel-
lent work that HD R&D does within the HMA sector was a 
great introduction to different organizations and different ap-
proaches to the work we do. After retiring from the Army, I 
volunteered with Golden West for 10 years and got the chance 
to really know the organization before taking on the job of 
CEO. In terms of lessons learned, NGOs aren’t so different 
from military organizations I served or commanded over the 
years. You try to find the best people you can, provide them 
the resources they need, provide them clear guidance, and 
then get out of their way and let them do the job.
3. During your past 13 years with Golden West, how do you 
feel explosive hazards clearance has evolved since you 
became a civilian?
Mine action’s strategic environment continues to shift and 
evolve. Since 2005, when donors primarily focused on land-
mine clearance issues, we have seen growth of concerns re-
garding cluster munitions and a growing interest in physical 
security and stockpile management. The days when the large 
foreign mine action groups had plenty of funded work in 
clearing mines are largely ending and diversity of missions 
within the sector have become much more competitive. I am 
a bit disappointed that more American NGOs have not been 
created to support HMA. The United States is by far the big-
gest donor to worldwide ERW operations, yet the sector con-
tinues to be dominated by foreign HMA organizations.  
In many areas, we are finally to a point where attention is 
shifting from proactive to reactive responses, and to exam-
ination of methods to manage residual ERW. This requires 
more attention to building real capacity in national programs 
now dominated by international NGOs, and preparing na-
tional programs to assume unilateral responsibility for HMA.
4. Going forward, what opportunities do you see for Golden 
West and other HMA NGOs, and how well-prepared do 
you think the community is for the future?
Sadly, wars continue to add ERW around the world, so I 
doubt there will be any shortage of opportunities for the sec-
tor in the foreseeable future. The challenge will continue to be 
finding adequate funding, and finding highly qualified people 
who want to do HMA NGO work. My concern is that a gener-
ation of military EOD operators have been forced to focus on 
the improvised explosive device-fight at the cost of detailed 
technical knowledge of ammunition and explosives. The sec-
tor badly needs EOD and ammunition experts with more 
than a superficial knowledge of munitions, who can also be 
diplomats, often working independently to train and mentor 
technicians and to advise host nation technical and govern-
ment agencies.
5. While working in HMA, what experience, lesson, or event 
has impacted you in your role as CEO the most? (This 
could be a travel experience, people met/worked with, 
challenge, etc.)
I first met Senior Colonel Nguyen Quang Bieu, from the 
People’s Army of Vietnam when he attended an HD R&D 
HMA Workshop in 2003. At that time, he was assigned to 
the External Relations Department (ERD) of the Vietnamese 
Ministry of National Defense. Over the course of that week, 
we had the opportunity to talk and learned that we had served 
our respective countries in roughly the same places during 
1971–1972. That war was in the distant past, but Bieu was the 
first former adversary with whom I was comfortable discuss-
ing it. I invited them to my home where my wife, Be, cooked 
Vietnamese food for all of us. Bieu and I became fast friends 
and we did our best to continue to keep up our discussion.
Sometime after I retired from the U.S. Army and joined 
Golden West, I learned that Bieu was also retiring from the 
Army of Vietnam. At the time, we were struggling to establish 
an HMA program in Vietnam and having little luck soliciting 
support from the ERD or other Vietnamese agencies. I sug-
gested he might consider coming to work with Golden West. 
Bieu became Golden West’s Vietnam Country Representa-
tive and soon was the key to gaining access in Vietnam. We 
worked together for 10 years, and he never failed to provide 
good counsel, even in the face of unremitting frustration. He 
helped guide the organization through a series of growing 
pains and helped me understand how to negotiate the intrica-
cies of Vietnamese bureaucracy. 
Most of all, he helped me learn that former enemies can tru-
ly be friends. His essential humanity impressed and gave me 
hope that all the other wars since have the potential for some 
sort of reconciliation. Bieu suddenly passed away in early 
February 2019 and was honored as a hero of Vietnam during 
a formal state funeral. He was my personal hero, because de-
spite fighting serious illness, he stayed active in Golden West 
and our programs to aid Vietnam’s recovery from ERW. His 
passing was not just a loss to Golden West but to the entire 
HMA sector. 
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1. In your opinion, what are the main challenges facing the 
conventional weapons destruction (CWD) and humanitar-
ian mine action (HMA) community today? How can the in-
ternational community address there?
We have clear goals and the skills to free millions across the 
world from the fear of landmines and bombs; we have strong 
political backing from many places and great donors but this 
support needs to be expanded. The main challenge our com-
munity faces is universal political will. 
Funding continues to be an issue for the sector as a whole, 
in many areas the amounts we need are, in global budgetary 
terms, not huge. More political will from some actors to con-
tribute creatively to this financial need would go a long way. 
Stronger collaboration with and support for governments in 
affected states to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities 
would make our sector more cost effective and sustainable and 
must be delivered.
2. How has your prior experience in the humanitarian sec-
tor prepared you for being CEO of MAG? What lessons 
have been the most valuable for you? 
I have learnt that if you stick to your principles and have 
high technical standards, then you’ll achieve the best you can. 
Nearly 30 years in the humanitarian sector have given me ex-
tensive experience of solving complex problems in environ-
ments, which are physically and politically extremely difficult. 
The people who work in the humanitarian, CWD, and HMA 
sectors are very motivated and committed and they need the 
same thing—to have the right skills and support at the right 
time. Oh, and a sense of humour and humility go a long way!
 
3. Going forward what opportunities do you see for MAG 
and other HMA nongovernmental organizations (NGO) 
and how well prepared do you think the community is for 
the future?
The biggest opportunity is for HMA NGOs to be a key part 
of delivering a mine free world—this is a rare chance for the 
international community to show that when it makes a com-
mitment, as it did over 20 years ago in the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention, that it delivers on that promise. 
Beyond this, the skills and knowledge that we have are 
unique in the NGO world and we must apply them to other 
problems which threaten people’s safety and their futures—
for example the management and destruction of small arms 
and light weapons and ammunition—we just need to be 
clearer and more creative about how we use this knowledge 
and skills.
4. As a strong, female leader involved in the NGO sec-
tor, what has been the most significant barrier of your 
career?
The biggest barrier is always if you don’t believe you can 
do something. Once you’re over that and you believe you can, 
then there is always a way to do anything so long as your heart 
is in the right place. It’s a real joy to see younger women clear-
ing this hurdle with ease!  
5. While working in HMA, what experience or lesson or 
event has impacted you in your role as CEO the most?
 Every time I travel to a MAG program, I talk to ordinary 
people in the communities where we work, and there is always 
someone who says or does something that reminds me of why 
we’re there, and it sticks in my mind. When the day-to-day 
business is complicated and difficult, then remember that one 
person and do the right thing by them. 
DR. JANE  COCKING, OBE 
Dr. Jane Cocking joined MAG (Mines Advisory Group) as chief executive in 
January 2017. She has more than 25 years’ experience in the humanitarian sec-
tor and has led response to multiple crises across the world, from Somalia to 
Syria. Cocking has also been involved in many strategic initiatives to improve the 
quality of humanitarian response. She worked for the ODA (the Department for 
International Development’s predecessor) and Save the Children before spending 
almost 20 years with Oxfam GB, eight as Humanitarian Director.
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Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are esti-mated to affect the lives of two million people in eastern Ukraine, restricting freedom of movement and access to key infrastructure and livelihoods.1 Estimates on casual-
ties vary widely and are often inconsistent. Nevertheless, estimates 
range between 1,600 and 3,600 military personnel and civilians who 
have fallen victim to mines and ERW since 2014.2
Recent contamination in the region is the result of the ongoing 
conflict between Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian sep-
aratists in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.3 Although the full extent 
of contamination is unknown, conservative estimates suggest that 
about 20 sq km (7.72 sq mi) are contaminated.4
Currently, at least three government institutions are directly in-
volved with humanitarian demining, with the support of three inter-
national NGOs.5 Many more organizations are involved in mine risk 
education (MRE), victim assistance, stockpile destruction, advocacy 
and training, advisory, and coordination of the mine action program. 
However, until January 2019, there was no strong legal framework 
to orchestrate these efforts.3 This article describes the current legal 
framework for mine action in Ukraine, analyzes the legislative pro-
cess and bureaucratic impediments, and briefly discusses the differ-
ent prospects of the newly-adopted mine action law.
Legislative Process
Representatives of mine action stakeholders in Ukraine agree 
that the obstacles to passing national legislation were not techni-
cal. Throughout the years, the mine action community has consoli-
dated lessons learned and developed best practices for developing 
national mine action laws.7–9 Moreover, international organizations 
have provided direct support to the Ukrainian government in help-
ing to overcome any technical obstacles.10 Yet, a specific legislation 
on mine action was approved only recently by the Ukrainian gov-
ernment. On 6 November 2018, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) 
of Ukraine conducted the first reading of draft law No. 9080-1.11 
However, it was returned for further amendments, and internation-
al organizations were asked to present their thoughts and sugges-
tions.12 The second reading of the bill took place exactly one month 
later, and the legislation was approved on 6 December 2018.13 The 
by Henrique Garbino [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ]
Newly Adopted Mine Action Law: 
What Does This Mean 
for MA Programs?
UKRAINE’s
draft law was then forwarded to the Cabinet of Ministers, which ap-
proved the legislation on 25 January 2019.
Instead of technical issues, the main challenges seemed to be of 
a political nature, as the very exercise of passing a law is a strenu-
ous and time-consuming process. Moreover, the ongoing conflict 
has taken up most of the political attention and resources. Parallel 
to the conflict, the 2014 revolution triggered a series of reforms that 
are still taking place and most likely will continue to require politi-
cal attention.14 The new mine action legislation will inevitably lead to 
another reform, which would affect roles, responsibilities, and bud-
geting among government authorities. Needless to say, such changes 
are likely to prompt internal friction and disagreement.14 In addi-
tion, private interests pushed forward by commercial companies led 
to considerable disagreements over the framework of the future mine 
action legislation during negotiations.15 Despite lengthy discussions, 
former inaction, and other delays in the adoption of a mine action 
law, government authorities slowly came to an agreement of their 
shared roles and responsibilities.16 
Mine Action in Ukraine
The new law “On mine action in Ukraine” lays the legal and organi-
zational groundwork for conducting mine action in Ukraine and also 
highlights the peculiarities of exercising state regulation in this area.18
The law defines “the legal ground, objectives and principles, na-
tional interests of Ukraine in the mine action ambit, a list of the mine 
action objects and entities, the procedure of their creation together 
with organizational and procedural principles of operation; require-
ments to mine action and demining specialists and their responsibili-
ties; mine action sources of financing; the registration procedure for 
mine action operators, rendering assistance to blast victims, fram-
ing the status of territories intended for mine action purposes, etc.”13
Importantly, the law calls for a civilian-led mine action center, in 
order to “[provide] for regulations that govern democratic civic con-
trol in the field of mine action, the national interests of Ukraine in the 
field of mine action, the principles of international cooperation and 
implementation of economic activities in the field of mine action, in-
cluding liability insurance during mine clearance and public procure-
ment in the field of mine action.” The law also establishes the grounds 
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for procuring contracts for mine action services and provides liabil-
ity for violating the mine action legislation.13
The new legislation is to be implemented by mid-2019, includ-
ing the establishment of both the National Mine Action Authority 
and Mine Action Center.12 It provides the necessary legal framework 
and institutional structure to advance the mine action program in 
Ukraine. However, because the law was passed after the 2019 budget 
had been approved, there is no dedicated government budget for its 
implementation.19 Therefore, it is still uncertain how and when the 
law will be implemented.
Before and After the Mine 
Action Legislation
Prior to the conflict, a presidential decree established a National 
Mine Action Authority (NMAA) in Ukraine on September 2013. The 
Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Department of Environmental Safety 
and Mine Action was tasked to coordinate the in-country mine ac-
tion program, acting as the secretariat for the NMAA.3 At that time, 
the focus was on the destruction of stockpiles and legacy ERW from 
World War I and II.20
Figure 1. Mine and ERW casualties in eastern Ukraine.6
Figure courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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After the conflict erupted in 2014, the scope of the problem 
increased substantially, and many other actors joined the demining 
effort, including different government bodies, international organi-
zations, NGOs, and the private sector. Although the MOD remained 
the de facto coordinating body for humanitarian demining, it did not 
have the required authority over other ministries and government 
institutions currently involved in mine action. The coordination of 
MRE activities, for example, was mostly undertaken by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP)-led mine action subcluster, 
but not without flaws.21 There was sometimes poor or no coordination 
among partners performing MRE, with a high risk of leaving gaps in 
some areas and duplication of efforts in others.21 Likewise, local civil 
authorities in mine-affected communities did not seem to be informed 
about the scope of the problem and the location of hazardous areas 
in their region, let alone the current demining plans and activities.22
According to the mine action legislation passed in late January 2019, 
the new National Mine Action Authority should be “a permanent in-
terdepartmental collegial authority, set by the Cabinet of Ministers 
of Ukraine.”18 This structure should allow for better coordination 
among the different governmental authorities currently involved in 
mine action, although the challenge of ensuring local-level mine risk 
awareness and program support remains.
While Ukraine’s MOD is understandably mostly preoccupied with the 
ongoing conflict, it will remain the responsible authority for the priori-
tization of clearance tasks until the establishment of the National Mine 
Action Center by 25 April 2019. However, while immediate emergency 
and short-term security needs are a logical priority from a defense and 
security perspective, this might at times be contrary to long-term socio- 
economic perspectives and humanitarian objectives. For example, cer-
tain existing minefields might be regarded by the military as a necessary 
defensive obstacle and not be prioritized for clearance, even though it af-
fects a large number of civilians.
In the absence of national standards, Ukraine adopted the 
International Mine Action Standards in September 2016 as a provi-
sory measure until National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) were 
approved.3 With the support of international actors, the MOD has 
drafted different NMAS since 2016. However, even though most mine 
action operators had agreed to follow them, the standards were not 
binding without national legislation to enforce them.23 The MOD fi-
nalized the NMAS in late 2018 and, with the endorsement of the newly- 
passed national mine action legislation, expects to fully implement 
them by the end of 2019.18,24
However, as one of the consequences of the delayed legislation, 
there have been inconsistencies throughout the mine action program 
in Ukraine. First, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories 
and Internally Displaced Persons, for example, had developed its own 
standards for MRE, which then competed with the MOD’s. Second, 
information management has been subject to duplication of efforts 
and discrepancies. At least two main mine action datasets are cur-
rently in place, one managed by the MOD and another by the State 
Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU). There has been no clear di-
vision of responsibilities for data collection, especially for mine and 
ERW casualties, perhaps explaining the inconsistency and probable 
underreporting seen in this area.16,25 Moreover, the standards used 
for data entry differ from common international practice, leading to 
grossly overestimated figures for clearance activities.26 The new leg-
islation attempts to tackle those issues by abiding to the Information 
Management System for Mine Action and centralizing information 
under the National Mine Action Center.18
Unfortunately, compulsory accreditation and quality management 
processes were only recently established by the new mine action law.18 
Humanitarian demining organizations have operated under individ-
ual memorandums of understanding with the MOD and are tasked 
by its Coordinating Group for Mine Action. Clearance procedures 
National roundtable on national mine action standards in Kiev, 14 June 2018.22
Image courtesy of Miljenko Vahtaric, Technical Adviser on Humanitarian Mine Action, OSCE.
15
JOURNAL: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2019
 THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION16
Henrique Siniciato Terra Garbino
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research
Henrique Garbino served in the Brazilian 
Army from 2006 to 2017 as a combat 
engineer officer and an EOD special-
ist. He is currently a master’s student at 
Uppsala University Department of Peace 
and Conflict Research and, as part of the 
Rotary Peace Fellowship, he was posted 
for three months to FSD programs in Tajikistan and Ukraine.
were not externally verified before, during, or after execution and 
cleared land could not be officially released for use by the population. 
In the end of September 2018, the Ministry of Defense started its own 
accreditation process, but like the NMAS, they are only enforceable if 
backed up by the national legislation.24 The current legal framework 
establishes an Accreditation and Monitoring Commission, but that is 
yet to be implemented.18
Until the NMAA is established, stakeholders need to deal with 
multiple interlocutors and risk miscommunication. A European 
Union (EU)-funded project in support of the State Special Transport 
Service’s demining teams had to be closed after it was transferred 
from the auspices of the Ministry of Infrastructure to the MOD, be-
cause the EU could not support the Ukrainian military due to their 
funding policies.27 Some argue that the lack of a specific legal frame-
work caused concern and mistrust among prospective donors, thus 
limiting the availability of international funding.10,28 In order to ad-
dress these concerns, the newly established NMAA will be respon-
sible to act in the name of the state when dealing with international 
organizations within the sphere of mine action.18
An additional flaw was that the previous legal framework for 
mine action did not cover specific compensations and assistance 
for mine victims, deminers, and citizens who lost access to their 
livelihoods due to mine and ERW contamination. In fact, Ukrainian 
law only now distinguishes mine victims from other conflict-related 
victims.18,24 Even though the new legislation accounts for medical 
and socio-psychological support for victims of explosive ordnance, 
it only grants a one-time monetary compensation for persons under 
18 years old.19 Moreover, it does not address many of the legal 
disputes that may arise in terms of land rights and compensation for 
lost livelihoods.18
Finally, the absence of specific procurement provisions—an issue 
not addressed by the new legislation—has hindered import and us-
age of dual-use equipment and vehicles, such as mine detectors, ar-
mored vehicles, and explosives. International operators face a series 
of bureaucratic impediments to import dual-use material and until 
this day are not authorized to dispose of the mines and ERW found 
during clearance operations.16 Instead, the MOD or SESU explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams are required to dispose of items. This 
current practice puts an unnecessary burden on EOD units, slows 
down clearance operations, and leaves mines and ERW exposed for 
longer periods of time, increasing the risk of accidents and criminal 
use of the ordnance.23
Despite the general excitement with which the mine action commu-
nity received the newly adopted legislation, the law has raised serious 
concerns especially among donors. Article 8 states that “donor- 
sponsored financial resources are credited to a special fund of the 
state budget under the relevant budget programs.”24 In other words, 
donor funding should be pooled and managed by a government or-
ganization, and not directly by the implementing partners. While 
this provision was supported by representatives of the defense and 
security industry, it is unacceptable for most donors and could re-
sult in a large decrease, if not cessation, of funds from internation-
al donors.29,30 Nonetheless, Articles 20 and 28 assign the Ukrainian 
Cabinet of Ministers the responsibility to regulate mine action opera-
tors who are directly funded by donors. This raises the question of the 
legality of direct donor funding.19 The issue was raised, and member 
of parliament Ivan Vinnyk proposed the Ukrainian Parliament vote 
in the plenary session on whether to direct donor funding of mine ac-
tion, but the vote did not pass, and the question remains unanswered. 
Although the law is still valid, humanitarian mine action funding is 
at risk and is already impacting donor funding decisions relating to 
the future of continued mine action operations in Ukraine.31
Conclusion
Until January 2019, Ukraine did not have a national mine ac-
tion legislation. However, the lack of specific legislation was not an 
insurmountable challenge for humanitarian demining and relat-
ed activities. While important for addressing practical issues, such 
legislation is a crucial step toward ownership, and is an opportuni-
ty for a fresh start, to rectify working relationships, and adopt new 
procedures and higher-quality standards.13
Moreover, the new law is necessary to unleash the full potential 
of mine action in Ukraine by de-conflicting competing efforts and 
facilitating bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, the new mine ac-
tion law shows Ukraine’s commitment to addressing the problem of 
contamination by mines and ERW and may enhance donor trust in 
funding a national program.14 Nevertheless, while the newly adopted 
legislation has clarified many inconsistencies of the Ukrainian mine 
action program, it has also shown significant gaps and created further 
uncertainty, especially in relation to direct donor funding and gov-
ernment budget for its implementation.19
Finally, while the new legislation is important now, it will be much 
more so when the conflict calms down. As the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine decreases in intensity and full clearance starts in the buffer 
zone, the number of operators and donors will likely increase, as will 
the need for better coordination and resource management.32 For 
now, with the support of international organizations, Ukrainian au-
thorities bear the greatest responsibilities in implementing the mine 
action legislation.
See endnotes page 69
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T he HALO Trust (HALO) has been working in Ukraine since 2015, a year after the hostilities in the east of the country began. Both the ongoing conflict in the Donbas and ten-sions on the border with Russia have left large areas of land 
contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). In places where the frontline has moved on and the fighting 
has stopped, mines and other ERW remain, preventing the lives of ci-
vilians from returning to normal.  
HALO currently has around 400 full-time staff employed in 
Ukraine and is conducting manual and mechanical clearance, non-
technical and technical survey, risk education, and some capacity 
building with state authorities to enhance their capabilities to car-
ry out humanitarian survey and data gathering. HALO’s program in 
Ukraine is currently funded by the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland, and has 
received funding in the past from Switzerland, the Czech Republic, 
and the European Union.
As in every part of the world, Ukraine has its own set of chal-
lenges that affect humanitarian mine clearance. The key challenges 
facing humanitarian mine clearance in Ukraine relate to the main 
threat types encountered: tripwire-initiated devices and both metal- 
and minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines. There are additional chal-
lenges relating to the specifics of the Ukrainian context: demining in 
an active conflict zone, working without explosives, and the extreme 
weather conditions. New techniques and technology, some tried and 
tested in other countries, are being explored. These are too numer-
ous to list; however, we will discuss a few of the key ways HALO is 
overcoming some of the challenges of conducting humanitarian mine 
clearance in Ukraine.
 Context
The two regions of Donetsk and Luhansk are currently in a de facto 
state of division between the territory controlled by the government 
by Toby Robinson and Rosanna O’Keeffe [ The HALO Trust ]
The Challenges of 
Humanitarian Mine Clearance 
in 
Image 2: A RDG-5 hand grenade with a nylon tripwire.
Image 1. Items found on HALO tasks. A TM-62 anti-vehicle 
mine with fuze visible on the surface and side exposed 
through excavation.
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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of Ukraine and separatist non-government controlled areas (NGCA). 
The terms of the Minsk ceasefire agreement created a 15 km (9.3 mi) 
buffer zone on either side of the line of contact between the two op-
posing forces and forbade the stationing of heavy weaponry within 
the zone. Despite the agreement, shelling and crossfire between both 
sides occurs on an almost daily basis.  
Land inside the buffer zone and on the line of contact is heavily 
contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). 
While the location of the line of contact now remains largely static, 
in 2014 and 2015 it was far more f luid with large areas of territory 
regularly changing hands during the fighting. This has resulted in 
widespread mine and UXO contamination, not just along the cur-
rent line of contact but also within and outside of the buffer zone. 
Additionally, civilians continue to live in areas where neither side 
has full control, commonly referred to as the grey zone. Here the 
threat from landmines and UXO is also prevalent.
Figure 1. Maps showing the major movements of the non-government controlled areas from May 2014 to 
March 2016 when the line of contact became more static.
18
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss1/1
ISSUE 23.1 @ APRIL 2019 19
Figure 2. Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions showing HALO’s current area of op-
erations.
Ukraine is a Party to the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and in 2018 
received approval of its request to extend its 
deadline to 1 June 2021 to clear its territo-
ry of all known anti-personnel minefields. 
However, the extension request stated that 
achieving these obligations was dependent 
on “…completion of hostilities, restoration 
of the constitutional order and gaining the 
full control over the occupied territories, 
including over the state border between 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”1 
Currently HALO is only able to work 
in areas controlled by the government of 
Ukraine and is working across both oblasts 
inside and outside the buffer zone. HALO 
is unable to work on the line of contact or 
the grey zone but teams are working to sur-
vey and clear areas close by where the threat 
of mines and UXO is affecting the civilian 
population. Therefore the challenges out-
lined only refer to the areas within eastern 
Ukraine where HALO works. They do not re-
fer to the nature of the mine and ERW prob-
lem in areas of Ukraine where HALO is not 
working: the grey zone, the line of contact 
itself, and the NGCAs, which may differ in 
terms of threat type.
Ukraine-Specific 
Challenges
Operating in conflict-affected regions. 
While the intensity of the conflict in Ukraine 
has decreased since the heavy fighting of 2014, 
indirect fire and shooting close to the line of 
contact remains a reality. HALO does not 
work in areas where there is a threat of mines being relaid. However, 
the buffer zone contains the most areas with mine contamination, and 
this means there is a need to work in some areas that are only a few 
kilometers from the line of contact. Although civilians and NGOs are 
not deliberately targeted, working in such close proximity to the line 
of contact does present a risk to demining teams from stray indirect 
fire. Careful consideration of the security situation in those particu-
lar areas is required before demining teams deploy close to the line of 
contact. If shelling occurs nearby or there has been a major escalation 
close to the minefield, work is suspended and teams moved in order 
to guarantee the security of demining staff. HALO does not deploy 
teams in those areas where there is a high threat of indirect fire or close 
to active military positions; however, there are inevitably times when 
demining teams within the buffer zone have to suspend work and are 
moved as a safety precaution. 
Destruction of items. Humanitarian demining operators do not 
yet have access to explosives in Ukraine, nor permission to carry out 
render-safe procedures. This hinders the work but is not an insur-
mountable problem. Rather than conducting demolitions, the de-
struction or removal of ERW requires close coordination with the 
State Emergency Service (SES). When HALO finds a mine or item 
of UXO, the SES is contacted and their assistance is requested. 
Although this generally works well, the situation in Ukraine means 
that the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity of the SES is 
often over-stretched. In some cases the lead time between the dis-
covery of an item and its removal can be a number of days. In cases 
where the device poses a particular danger such as where a tripwire- 
initiated device is discovered, deminers have to be moved a safe 
distance away to work elsewhere on the minefield. Where there is a 
significant delay in a device’s destruction or removal the clearance 
strategy of the minefield can be disrupted. 
Challenges in the Minefields
Non-technical and technical survey. The nature of mine clear-
ance is that the majority of the time the mines remaining in a con-
taminated area are buried or concealed. Therefore in order to avoid 
clearing land unnecessarily non-technical and technical survey 
methods are used. Where minelaying has been conducted in a uni-
form pattern, technical survey methods can be useful. Technical 
survey involves conducting limited clearance to find exactly where 
a mine-line is, enabling the follow-up clearance of the minefield to 
be more targeted and avoiding the need to clear areas far from the 
identified pattern.
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The type of minelaying in Ukraine varies between professionally 
laid defensive belts placed in a clear uniform pattern, such as a line 
of evenly spaced anti-vehicle mines across a field, and sporadic mine-
laying. The latter being due either to low-level tactical considerations 
dictating the logic of where small numbers of mines have been placed 
or because of nuisance minelaying conducted by non-professional 
soldiers or combatants. 
The prevalence of this sporadic minelaying can often severely limit 
the usefulness of technical survey. It is difficult to find a pattern when 
there was no pattern or where the logic of the minelaying was down 
to tactical rather than geographic considerations relevant at the time. 
Even in the case of defensive minefields laid in a clear uniform 
pattern by professional military units, an operator’s ability to con-
duct technical survey can be limited if a large number of mines 
have already been removed by military forces or the local popula-
tion. These minefields still require clearance because some mines 
may have been missed. However, by removing mines from an area, 
the original pattern becomes obscured and establishing where the 
mine-line was can be difficult. This can result in larger amounts of 
clearance needing to be conducted in order to find a relatively small 
amount of mines.
Aids to non-technical survey. In cases where minelaying is spo-
radic and the benefits of technical survey are limited, good quality 
non-technical survey becomes ever more im-
portant. Where it can be difficult to establish a 
pattern or logic to the minelaying through tech-
nical survey or the early stages of clearance, in-
formation from local communities and other 
informants can often help mitigate this. A good 
understanding of the tactical situation in a par-
ticular area at the time of the minelaying can of-
ten be far more effective than trying to rely on 
traditional technical survey methods. Moreover, 
there is an archive of high-quality satellite imag-
es of Ukraine available on Google Earth. Given 
that the minelaying is relatively recent, predom-
inantly 2014-2015, these images sometimes re-
veal evidence of minelaying that is no longer 
visible on the ground. An example of this are the 
tracks from a military minelaying machine, as 
shown in Figure 3. Such imagery aids the accu-
racy of non-technical survey and can eventually 
lead to more efficient clearance. 
Clearing tripwire-initiated devices and minimum-met-
al mines. The most common devices encountered by HALO in 
Ukraine are tripwire-initiated hand grenades, anti-personnel 
bounding-fragmentation mines (OZM-72s), both metal-cased and 
minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines (TM-62 and TM-62P), and di-
rectional fragmentation mines (generally the MON series of an-
ti-group mines). There is also the threat of UXO, ranging from 
small-caliber cannon rounds to large-caliber mortar rounds. 
Furthermore, many minefields contain a combination of different 
threats. Open media sources document that anti-personnel blast 
mines such as PMN-2s and MS-3s, along with a range of improvised 
devices and booby-traps, have also been used in the conflict, but at 
the time of writing HALO has not found these types of items during 
its clearance operations in Ukraine.
The possibility of a wide variety of threat types, including trip-
wire-initiated devices, has to be considered when clearing an area. 
Of land currently surveyed by HALO and remaining to be cleared, 
75 percent has a potential tripwire threat. The remaining 25 percent 
are anti-vehicle mine-only tasks, of which 12 percent are minimum-
metal mines and 13 percent are metal-cased mines.  
Minefields that involve the clearance of tripwires, or minimum-
metal anti-vehicle mines, are slower to clear than land with metal 
Figure 3. Google Earth imagery of a surveyed minefield in Donetsk region. The 
arrow indicates three visible lines created by a military mine laying machine. 
The road is to the west and the tracks run in a south-easterly direction across 
the field.
Metal anti-tank
Minimum metal anti-tank
Mixed threat
Tripwire
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
Average clearance rates in m2 by threat type
Figure 4. Graph showing comparative speed of clearance rates measure in the square meters cleared, per team, per month.
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anti-vehicle mines only, without the threat from tripwire devices. 
Additionally, unlike many countries with a historic legacy of mine 
contamination, most of the tripwires in Ukraine are still intact, hav-
ing only been laid within the last five years and being made of either 
metal or nylon. This means metal detectors cannot be relied upon 
alone as a means of searching for tripwires. As a result, a visual drill 
involving the use of a fiber rod to guide the eye followed by the in-
cremental removal of vegetation is required. This is intrinsically slow 
when compared with clearance methods for other threat types (as 
shown in Figure 4).  
In minefields where there is only a threat of metal anti-vehicle 
mines, deminers can conduct clearance by walking over the suspect 
ground with a large-loop metal detector with the sensitivity cali-
brated to the mine-type. Deminers then manually investigate met-
al signals. This process enables clearance rates of over 50,000 sq m 
(59,8000 sq yd) per team per month. This process is slowed, however, 
when the threat of tripwire-initiated devices is also a possibility. In 
such instances the slower tripwire search must be conducted across 
the minefield before a large-loop detector can be used to look for the 
buried anti-vehicle mines. Therefore, what would ordinarily be a rela-
tively fast method of clearance is slowed to an average rate of 5,000 sq 
m (5,980 sq yd) per team per month, by the presence or suspicion of 
tripwire-initiated devices.  
The clearance of areas where the threat of minimum metal anti- 
vehicle mines is suspected also poses challenges and is often slow com-
pared with searching for metal-cased mines. This is due to the need to 
use more sensitive detectors to locate the mines, which inevitably also 
results in more signals from small metallic clutter being picked up that 
have to be investigated through manual soil excavation to determine 
whether a threat exists. This problem is exacerbated by contamination 
from shelling thereby increasing the levels of metal clutter in the soil. 
Moreover, Ukraine’s famously fertile chernozem soil is heavily min-
eralized, further limiting the range of suitable detectors. While the chal-
lenge of searching for minimum-metal mines is not unique to Ukraine, 
in places where this threat is combined with 
a need to search for tripwire-initiated de-
vices, it results in a significantly more time- 
consuming process when compared with 
clearing other types of mines.  
New Detectors
HALO is anticipating deploying a team 
with combined ground penetrating radar 
(GPR) and metal detectors in 2019. The GPR 
detectors should enable metallic clutter to 
be distinguished from anti-vehicle mines. 
By being able to better distinguish between 
clutter and the profile of an anti-vehicle 
mine, teams can rapidly excavate clutter, 
leaving the remaining signals to be excavat-
ed as per standard procedures. This should 
increase the efficiency of clearing anti- 
vehicle minefields where there are large 
amounts of metal fragmentation from shell-
ing. Such detectors have had a significant 
Image 3 and 4: A Large Loop Detector used for clearing anti-vehicle mines (left) in contrast to a deminer conducting trip-
wire clearance (right).
Image 5. A deminer using a ‘Minelab UXO-head’ detector, searching for minimum- 
metal plastic cased anti-vehicle mines.
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make excavations incredibly slow and grueling. Enabling 
work to continue in such conditions relies on using cre-
ative methods and respecting the tough conditions the 
teams are working in. Ensuring teams are equipped with 
suitable clothing and boots and have the facilities and 
time required to warm up on the minefields is funda-
mental. In such conditions it is crucial to ensure demin-
ers are able to maintain concentration to ensure safe and 
efficient work. 
Mechanical assets. HALO Ukraine is building its me-
chanical capacity and currently the program has two 
front loaders and is looking into further mechanical op-
tions. The front loaders are currently being used to clear 
areas such as former military positions that are difficult 
and slow for manual teams. Having a mechanical ca-
pacity also enables some clearance teams to be deployed 
through the winter months. 
2019 will see the trial and deployment of lightly ar-
mored remote vegetation cutters. The objective of these 
machines is to support manual teams by cutting the 
vegetation ahead of their progress on a task. It is expected this will 
improve the efficiency of the drill by speeding up one of the most 
time-consuming parts of the process: the careful investigation and 
removal of vegetation. Depending on the success of these machines, 
a lighter equivalent will be considered with the aspiration to deploy 
them onto minefields where there is a mixed threat of devices such as 
tripwires and anti-vehicle mines. 
Melting frozen ground. During winter, fires are lit in safe areas 
within the minefields to heat up a saline solution and provide warmth 
during breaks. The saline solution is used to thaw frozen ground. 
When a metal signal has been identified and isolated, the hot liquid 
is then poured over the soil. The ground is then covered with cut veg-
etation, which acts as insulation trapping the warmth. This process 
enables the ground to thaw overnight and makes soil excavations 
possible the following day. 
impact in other HALO programs such as Afghanistan, where in some 
places it has decreased the number of manual excavations required by 
over 90 percent, it is hoped the same success will be true for Ukraine. 
Incremental Changes to Drills
Seemingly small innovations can make drastic differences to clear-
ance rates. An example of this is the quadrat method, using a 2-by-
2 m (2.19-by-2.19 yd) boxing drill where lanes are cleared using the 
standard manual trip-wire search drill to create boxes over which a 
detector can be swept but without the need to use a fiber rod to slowly 
inspect the area inside the box. The size of the box and the fact it is sur-
rounded by cleared ground negates the presence of tripwires that are 
not clearly visible and sweeping a detector over the top ensures there 
is no device without a tripwire on the surface. Innovations such as this 
have made the existing drill faster without compromising on safety. 
Challenges From 
Extreme Climate 
Over the course of a year in Ukraine the 
temperature can vary across 60 C, and these 
extremes pose additional challenges for mine 
clearance. In the summer, temperatures on 
minefields can reach 40 C (104 F), and over 
the course of the long winter the tempera-
ture can drop to -20 C (-4 F). In January and 
February, the months with the most extreme 
weather, only the mechanical clearance teams 
can work. Snow makes effective and safe trip-
wire clearance impossible, and the short days 
and freezing temperatures can often inhibit 
clearance on tripwire minefields for even lon-
ger from November to March.
The cold conditions also affect other as-
pects of clearance. Snow and frozen ground 
Figure 5. A diagram demonstrating the ‘quadrat’ method.
Image 6. A HALO Ukraine front loader conducting mechanical mine clearance 
in challenging winter conditions.
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Looking Ahead
Beyond security and access restrictions, the primary challenges 
of conducting humanitarian mine clearance in Ukraine are from 
tripwire-initiated devices and minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines. 
HALO Ukraine is developing both technical and human methods 
to overcome the challenges posed and to increase the efficiency of 
clearing land. This involves using techniques and technology used 
elsewhere in the world but also requires the trialing of new ideas 
and innovations. Similarly, the challenges of working within the 
context of Ukraine are, where possible, also mitigated and over-
come through innovative means and where necessary through li-
aison with state bodies. 
Ultimately the importance of optimizing clearance rates and 
increasing the efficiency of HALO’s work in Ukraine is to remove 
life-threatening hazards from ERW contaminated land. The more ef-
ficiently minefields can be cleared the faster land can be returned for 
use by landowners and the community. Restoring land to its original 
state helps the lives and livelihoods of those living in affected areas 
return to normal. 
Although seeking new innovations is important, the major-
ity of the work is ultimately done by Ukrainian men and women. 
High-quality training provides the skills required to clear the land. 
Oversight and guidance from experienced demining team leaders 
and supervisors in the field ensures that safety is maintained and the 
quality and thoroughness of HALO’s clearance remains to the high-
est standards. It is therefore the quality of HALO’s personnel that is 
the most important factor. Developing their skills and building their 
experience allows HALO to deliver its lifesaving work despite the 
challenges faced within Ukraine. 
See endnotes page 69
Image 7. A deminer excavating through defrosted ground.
Image 8. Deminers warming up in sub-zero conditions, to 
the left is a barrel of saline solution.
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Since fighting began in 2014, significant areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine have been contaminated by landmines and unexploded ord-nance (UXO). This article will briefly cover the origin of 
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and its 
mandate, before turning to the types of contamination observed 
by the SMM in eastern Ukraine. On 21 March 2014, the 57 partici-
pating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) made a consensus decision to deploy the SMM, and 
the SMM’s mandate has been extended each year since. The SMM es-
tablishes facts and reports on the security situation across Ukraine, 
monitors and supports respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and facilitates dialogue.  
The SMM has around 600 unarmed civilian monitors in eastern 
Ukraine who patrol accessible areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions. The presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) forms a 
major impediment to the SMM’s freedom of movement across these 
regions, a fact tragically highlighted by a fatal incident on 23 April 
2017 near Pryshyb, after which the SMM’s patrols have been limited 
to asphalt and concrete surfaces only.1 
In terms of mine action, in signing the Minsk memorandum in 
September 2014, the sides have already agreed to remove all mines 
and not to install or lay mines in the security zone.2 There is an 
urgent need to clear contaminated residential areas, and items of 
ERW pose a serious danger to civilians crossing the area between 
the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of 
the armed formations.3
UKRAINE
by Edward Crowther [ OSCE ]
An unexploded PG-7L grenade lies by the side of the road in the 
area separating the armed parties. The bottles were placed there 
by locals to alert drivers to the presence of the UXO as emer-
gency services are not able to operate in the zone, 7 March 2017. 
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.
ICRC-installed sign warning of amphibious mines in the Azov Sea, Donetsk region.  
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.
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Lack of Information
One of the key problems from a mine action perspective is the 
lack of comprehensive non-technical surveys (NTS) in the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions, owing—among other factors—to a lack of ac-
cess to large areas of the contact line as the conflict remains active.4,5 
Many important NTS have been done, in particular in government-
controlled areas, but the international and government organizations 
that undertake surveys are mostly unable to work in the contact line 
area for obvious reasons, and no known form of NTS has been under-
taken in the non-government-controlled areas. 
This lack of information is a key impediment to the SMM, as it 
undertakes its work in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and direct-
ly affects the safety of SMM patrol teams. For this reason, as well as 
overall monitoring of commitment to the Minsk memorandum, the 
SMM—while not a mine action organization—takes a keen interest 
in the presence of ERW, reporting on these in its daily reports. This 
information comes not just from SMM patrol teams on the ground—
which have unique access to many areas on both sides of the contact 
line—but also via the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which 
help the SMM to overcome some of the freedom of movement restric-
tions imposed by the presence of ERW. 
Anti-tank and Anti-vehicle mines (ATM/AVM).6 By far, AVMs 
comprise the most prevalent type of mine contamination observed 
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The most common AVM type is 
the TM-62M, with the plastic-bodied TM-62P3 also being observed 
in fewer numbers. An unusual feature of the mine contamination 
observed by the OSCE SMM, compared to comparable minefields in 
other contemporary conflicts, is the prevalence of surface-laid AVM 
minefields. These range from small minefields across tarmac roads 
that comprise only a few mines to surface-laid minefields across large 
open fields. An SMM UAV recently identified a surface-laid linear 
minefield, most probably laid by a mechanical minelayer, which was 
2.7 km (1.7 mi) in length and contained an estimated 900 AVM.7 
The TM-83 off-route AVM has also been observed in small num-
bers in the Donetsk region, seen for the first time by the SMM in 
2019.8 Additionally, parts of the coast in the Donetsk region are 
known to be contaminated by PDM-1M amphibious mines. SMM 
monitors observed some of this mine laying taking place, and the 
same event was widely reported in open source media.9 
Anti-personnel mines (APM). Prior to the start of hostilities, the 
government of Ukraine had declared that no APM were emplaced 
on Ukrainian territory. With the subsequent emplacement of such 
mines, Ukraine in 2018 requested an extension of its deadline un-
der the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) to remove 
them. The Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC granted the ex-
tension, until 1 June 2021, at its 17th meeting in November 2018.10 
The SMM has observed a number of APM types across the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions. 
The OZM-72 bounding APM have been observed across the con-
flict area, and has been reported on by the SMM on numerous oc-
casions.11 Other AP mine types observed include the MON-series 
directional APM and the POM-2 APM.12 The SMM has also observed 
TM-62P3 mine, Donetsk region. 
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.
TM-83 off-route mine, Donetsk region. 
Image courtesy of OSCE/Jacek Hajdukiewicz.
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other evidence of APM use, such as the presence of the plastic 
cruciform-shaped tripwire launchers from POM-2 APMs scattered 
across tarmac roads in close proximity to the Donetsk water filtration 
station. OSCE monitors have been present during the demolition of 
PMN-2 APMs by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.13,14 
Unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM has observed and re-
ported on thousands of items of UXO on both sides of the line of 
contact. These range from small-arms ammunition all the way up to 
unexploded 300 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rock-
ets. An exhaustive list of all types of explosive hazards is beyond the 
scope of this article.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams conduct spot tasks on 
both sides of the contact line, and the SMM has enjoyed some success 
in reporting items of UXO to the respective sides and advocating for 
their removal.15 However, an area of difficulty is the area between the 
forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the 
armed formations, where neither side is able or willing to risk their 
personnel in clearing items of ERW left behind by shooting.2,3 
On several occasions, the SMM has observed items of ERW ly-
ing at the entry-exit checkpoints between the two sides.2 These entry-
exit checkpoints are already dangerous places for civilians, who are 
exposed to long queues in areas that lack adequate shelter, water, or 
proper sanitary resources, and who sometimes come under fire. The 
presence of ERW in close proximity, sometimes only a few meters 
away from queueing pedestrians or vehicles, only adds to these risks. 
As an example, a PG-7L round was observed on 7 March 2017, ly-
ing on the H15 highway in the area between the forward positions of 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the armed formations.3,16 
This entry-exit checkpoint is one of the busiest and is used by thou-
sands of civilians a day. Owing to the lack of EOD capacity able to 
work in the area between the forward positions, the round remained 
on the highway for several days, indicated with informal marking, be-
fore disappearing, probably removed by a civilian. 
Another issue of particular note is the presence of high-explosive 
bullets across the conflict area. The 12.7 mm MDZ snap action incen-
diary round has a small, high-explosive charge. A number of civilian 
casualties have been attributed to this round, with some occurring to 
young children who have picked them up. Painted bright red, they are 
often mistaken for standard incendiary rounds, and people are usu-
ally unaware of the dangers associated with them. 
Conclusion
The lack of information on the mine contamination situation in 
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine remains one of the 
key dangers to civilians in eastern Ukraine, as well as being one of 
the main impediments to the SMM’s freedom of movement in the 
area. Forwarding information about facts on the ground, includ-
ing the risks posed to civilians by ERW, is one way that the SMM 
makes a contribution toward a safer, more secure environment for 
civilians. 
See endnotes page 69
POM-2 APM in close proximity to the Donetsk water filtration station, Donetsk region. 
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.
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THE ENDLESS WAR
A PHOTO ESSAY BY ROCCO RORANDELLI
Many modern conflicts leave behind unexploded ordnance (UXO) in their after-
math, inflicting severe human, social, —and economic costs. Europe is not immune 
from this issue. Today, landmine-affected countries in Europe include Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia. With an average removal cost of EU€1,000 per 
mine, insufficient funding is the main reason why demining is still unfinished in this 
region after more than 20 years of work.1–-5 Every year, deminers and civilians die or 
are injured because of ordnance explosions.
A common sentiment of all organizations involved in demining operations is that 
greater funds are required to increase clearance capacity and demining in a timely 
manner. The goal of this project is to bring the current situation in the Balkans to the 
public’ attention. The following photographic documentation includes aerial photo-
graphs of minefields and demining operations as well as still-life images of exploded 
ordnance, tools used by deminers, prosthetic limbs, and survivors. 
See endnotes page 70
19 April 2016. Pristina, Kosovo. A prosthetic leg made by the 
Orthopaedic Research Society (ORS) for a 31-year-old male land-
mine survivor. ORS is a Kosovo-based company working with German 
manufacturer Ottobock. While governmental prosthetic legs cost 
about €500, ORS products range from €2,000 to €6,000. 
Survivors can afford prosthetics only through foreign- 
sponsored grants.
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22 April 2017. Assia, 76, by her home in the hills 
above Sarajevo. She stepped on an anti-tank mine, 
probably activated by an anti-personnel mine. In 
the explosion, she lost her legs, an arm, and 
severely injured her back. Doctors say that 
it is a miracle she survived. “After the ex-
plosion, there was a crater where we could 
have parked a car,” says her son, who to-
day takes care of Assia.
28
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss1/1
ISSUE 23.1 @ APRIL 2019 29
20 April 2016. Doganaj, Kosovo. Deminers work in a 100,000 sq m (119,599 sq yd) mine-
field located along a main road in Doganaj, contaminated by NATO BLU-97 cluster bombs. 
20 April 2016. Banjice, Drenas, Kosovo. A deminer working inside a 30,000 sq m 
(35,880 sq yd) minefield close to the village of Banjice. This minefield is planted with 
PMA-1 anti-personnel mines from the Yugoslavian army. Two villagers have died; one lost 
a leg, and one an eye in this minefield.
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23 April 2017. Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Alija Svraka, born in 
1960, is president of the association 
for invalids, with 120 members in 
Sarajevo, 50 percent of which are due 
to mines. While a soldier, he lost his 
legs in 1994 in Nišici while walking, 
sixth in line, in a column 
through a meadow. 
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1 July 2016. Doboj, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fertile agricultural area of Doboj is the most 
heavily mined in the country. Here, a deminer working for The HALO Trust is probing the ground 
along the borders for landmines. The area has already been cleared by a demining machine; how-
ever, clearance does not guarantee areas to be 100 percent mine-free, especially along borders.
10 July 2016. Kotur, Sisak, Croatia. A path separating a demined portion of the forest (top) and 
the contaminated portion of the forest that remains to be cleared (bottom).
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22 April 2017. Vitez, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Anita Vidovic, 26 
years-old, works for Caritas Bos-
nia in Sarajevo as a kindergar-
ten teacher. She lost her right 
leg in Dubravica on 1 April 2001. 
She was walking with her family 
along a path near her home, last 
in line, when she stepped on a 
mine. In the explosion, she lost 
her leg, and her cousin and aunt 
were injured. With her disability, 
she receives payments of about 
€90 per month. “I think in BiH 
people don’t talk enough about 
this problem, which seems to be 
hidden under a carpet.”
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4 July 2016. Dabar, Otoc˘ac, Croatia. A deminer walking inside a 1.8 sq km (0.7 sq mi) mine-
field. Demining was done in 2 shifts, from 8:00 to 13:00 and 13:00 to 18:00, with 50 de-
miners for each shift. On average, the cost to demine 1 sq km (0.4 sq mi) is €1 million.
13 April 2016. Zagermlje, Pejë, Kosovo. The controlled explosion of collected landmines in 
a 42,500 sq m (50,830 sq yd) minefield, discovered in 2015. Deminers have thus far recov-
ered 34 unexploded mines.
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23 April 2017. Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nizam Cancar, 42 years-old, has played 
with the Phantom club sitting-volleyball team since 1996, and won a gold medal at the 
London Olympic games and a silver medal at the Rio de Janeiro Olympic games. On 6 
October 1994, he lost his leg while working as a deminer and receives payments of €220 
per month. Exactly 22 years after his accident, on 6 October 2016, his son was born. 
“Our government has a problem talking about mines.” 
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10 July 2016. Kotur, Sisak, 
Croatia. A mined area inside 
the village of Kotur.
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20 April 2016. 
Zagermlje, 
Pejë, Kosovo. 
Remains of  an 
exploded BLU-
97 UK-made 
NATO clus-
ter bomb.
19 April 2016. 
Hoqe e Qytetit, 
Kosovo. A part 
of a deflagrated 
BL-755 cluster 
bomb.
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ITF ENHANCING 
HUMAN SECURITY 
ITF Enhancing Human Security has worked in Southeast Europe’s (SEE) post-conflict countries since 1998. In states affected by the break-up of Yugoslavia such as Serbia, 
ITF works to support the country’s fulfillment 
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC), and this involvement has proved crit-
ical to Serbia fulfilling its goals.1 
With a history of nationalistic antagonisms, a 
series of armed conflicts, secessions, and major 
political and state structural reforms stemming 
back to the turn of the 20th century, the histo-
ry of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) and Serbia is a long and con-
voluted one, intertwined with religious and eth-
nic tensions. 
Historical Context
After WWII, the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia came un-
der socialist rule, first as Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 
and then in 1963 as the SFRY, a socialist federation made up of 
the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. By the early 1990s, ethnic ten-
sions dissolved into armed conflicts, as Croatia, Slovenia, the 
Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from 
the SFRY.2,3 In 1992, Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and later transformed into the state 
union of Serbia and Montenegro.4 Since 2006, Montenegro and 
Serbia are separate independent states.5  
All six former republics have become independent states. However, 
many of these states, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 
have some of the heaviest concentrations of landmines and unex-
ploded ordnance (UXO) in the world. Serbia, which is contaminat-
ed with cluster munitions and continues to struggle with landmine 
contamination, is the focus of this article.6 Issues relating to hu-
manitarian demining in Serbia are numerous, and progress toward 
a resolution of the mine problem largely depends on the provision of 
adequate donor funds.7,8
Cluster Munitions
During the 1999 bombing, the NATO alliance dropped cluster 
bombs in 16 municipalities in the Republic of Serbia, namely Niš, 
Kraljevo, Brus, Preševo, Bujanovac, Kuršumlija, Raška, Gadžin Han, 
Tutin, Sjenica, Čačak, Vladimirci, Knić, Stara Pazova, and Sopot.9–11
During and immediately after the bombing, the armed forces and 
police conducted clearance of unexploded cluster munitions from the 
surface, which substantially contributed to the safety of civilians and 
reduced the number of victims, specifically children. Numerous clus-
ter munitions were deeply embedded in the ground and could not be 
initially detected, removed, or destroyed at the time, which is why 
surveys and clearance are presently needed to reduce the threat of ex-
plosive hazards for the local population. 
Thus far, in accordance with the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS), 11.25 sq km (4.34 sq mi) has been checked and 
cleared in the municipalities of Niš, Sjenica, Gadžin Han, Stara Pazova, 
Knić, Brus, Raška, Kraljevo, Užice, Čačak, Vladimirci, Kraljevo, 
Sopot, and Preševo, while it is suspected that cluster munitions can 
still be still found in the 2.5 sq km (0.97 sq mi) area around various 
locations in the municipalities of Sjenica, Tutin, Raška, Bujanovac, 
and Niš.12–14 Many of the cluster munition clearance project tasks were 
by Gregor Sancˇanin [ ITF Enhancing Human Security ]
ITF deminers at work in Ravno Bucˇje, Bujanovac.
All images courtesy of ITF Enhancing Human Security.
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conducted in highly-populated urban areas, such as in the city of Niš 
(e.g., the primary school Dušan Radović, Niš city-hospital grounds, 
Duvanište city-residential area, and the city’s industrial zone), as well 
as in the Kopaonik National Park and Mountain Resort.15–17
Mines 
During the 1990s, the Serbian Armed Forces placed landmines 
along the border with Croatia (Šid municipality, including Morović and 
Jamena). Even though there were no major military operations in this 
particular area, the minefields were placed for preventive purposes.   
In accordance with the ITF mandate, a mine action unit from 
INTERSOS, an Italian NGO committed to assisting the victims of 
natural disasters and armed conflicts, carried out a broader assess-
ment of the landmine/UXO problem in FRY in 2001. The assessment 
was collaborative and conducted with the FRY Federal Ministry of 
Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior 
of the Republic of Serbia. 
After obtaining the relevant information, the Mine Action Centre 
of Serbia (MACS), in cooperation with ITF, organized a specific sur-
vey of the suspected hazardous areas (SHA) in the villages of Jamena, 
Morović, and Batrovci (Municipality of Šid), estimated to be 10 sq km 
(3.86 sq mi). Consequently it was established that minefields, which 
included both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines totaled an area of 
5.9 sq km (2.28 sq mi).18 These areas were surveyed by MACS and 
cleared by demining companies through ITF between 2003 and 2009. 
There were a total of 44 project tasks, 5,139 various types of mines 
and other UXO were detected, removed, and destroyed.19,20 Along the 
borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, there are no more 
minefields on the Serbian side, and these areas are now safely used by 
the local population.21 
Post-clearance Effect on Demined  
Land in Šid
Šid municipality consists of 18 large villages and towns with over 
30,000 residents, including Morović village and Jamena village. This 
entire region of northwest Serbia is known for extremely fertile soil 
and high-quality forests, where mines directly obstructed agricultur-
al development.20,22 
The impact that minefield clearance had on this region was imme-
diate. The agricultural land and forests were demined (declared mine 
free by MACS) and handed over to local communities for safe use. 
Mine clearance of this area offered great socio-economic potential 
for the region and its residents, which was hindered for many years 
due to mine fields.
Ongoing Clearance
In late 2009, the MACS obtained information about SHAs in the 
municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac, and Kuršumlija in south-
central Serbia.23 A survey of the area was conducted from 2009 to 2011 
by Norwegian People’s Aid through ITF, where it was established that 
at that time, there were 10 confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) in the 
municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo, totaling approximately 3.5 
sq km (1.35 sq mi).24–26
Since 2012, and with the support of ITF and its donors, these areas 
are progressively being demined and resurveyed. In 2018, with the 
Items found at Lucˇane, Bujanovac.
Explosive item found at Bujanovac, Topolska Malhala.
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financial support of the Republic of Serbia, Republic of Korea, and the 
United States, five project locations in the Municipality of Bujanovac 
totaling 623,020 sq m (745,126 sq yd) of land was demined and re-
leased, removing 29 mines and 1,347 pieces of UXO. By early 2019, 
1.8 million sq m (2.15 million sq yd) of SHAs/CHAs remained to be 
technically treated and demined. In addition to Japan, the same 2018 
donors have committed funding for 2019. 
Post-clearance in Bujanovac
Bujanovac municipality consists of 58 large settlements, villages, 
and towns with approximately 40,000 residents. The southern regions 
of Serbia already struggle with underdevelopment, a lack of jobs, and 
the population migrating north toward Belgrade or emigrating. In 
such situations, the mined areas present an even heavier burden to the 
local population and also obstruct even minimal investments and de-
velopment. South-central Serbia has excellent climate conditions and 
fertile soil. In normal conditions, the predominantly agriculturally-
oriented local population would use every portion of land possible. 
The impact of mine clearance in Bujanovac was immediate. The ag-
ricultural land, which was demined, declared mine-free by MACS, 
and handed over to local communities for safe use, was used immedi-
ately by the local population for agriculture, wood/forest exploitation, 
forest-fruits picking, cattle breeding, etc. Demining this entire region 
would ensure enhanced human security, enable better socio-economic 
development, as well as attract potential foreign investments. 
Serbia and Treaty/Convention 
Obligations
The Republic of Serbia acceded to the APMBC on 18 September 
2003 (entered into force 1 March 2004).27 Initially, this committed 
Serbia to destroy all anti-personnel mine stockpiles by 2008 and to 
clear all mine-contaminated areas by 2014.28 Serbia later requested 
and received a five-year mine clearance extension of 1 March 2019. 
When it became clear that they also would not be able to meet the new 
deadline, it submitted a second extension request on 14 March 2018. 
On 30 November 2018, at the 17th Meeting of States Parties to the 
APMBC in Geneva, Switzerland, the Republic of Serbia was granted 
an extension of four years (until 1 March 2023). The extension request 
includes a substantive plan, thorough year-by-year operational goals, 
and defined milestones.29,30
Serbia did not sign and is not a State Party to the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions (CCM), even though it played an important role in 
the Oslo Process that produced this convention. At the political lev-
el, Serbia supports the CCM’s humanitarian objectives.  While Serbia 
has participated in several CCM meetings, it has stated that it cannot 
consider accession until its stocks of cluster munitions are destroyed.31
Donors and ITF Support
The MACS was established in 2002 as an organizational unit of 
the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs after a proposal by ITF to the 
federal government of Serbia. Since the inception of MACS, ITF has 
provided continuous support through technical equipment, vehicles, 
training, and administrative assistance.
Since 2002, ITF has raised almost US$25 million from various 
countries for activities in Serbia including mine clearance, cluster 
munition clearance, battle area clearance, training, equipment, and 
structural support to national capacities (i.e., MACS). With generous 
donor support through ITF, over 13.65 sq km (5.27 sq mi) of land on 
91 projection locations has been cleared and released, with almost 
7,200 explosive items (mines, cluster munitions, UXO) removed.
Serbia remains committed to resolving the mine problem, contin-
uously contributing its own funds for activities of mine clearance for 
the past three years.32 
Post-clearance Effect
The impact of mine, cluster munition, and other UXO clearance 
in Serbia is always immediate. By clearing and declaring any type of 
previously-affected land as free of contamination, Serbia can hand 
over land to the local population for immediate use. Clearance of the 
contaminated areas unlocks great socio-economic potentials for the 
country’s regions and its residents. 
Conclusion 
Serbia’s experience highlights the importance of a collaborative, 
multinational approach to explosive hazards clearance. Despite the 
history of clashes and ethnic rivalry within and among the states of 
SEE, the impact of landmines, ERW, and UXO often crosses political 
and socio-economic lines and can contribute to regional destabiliza-
tion. Ultimately, as Serbia continues to develop via socio-economic 
and infrastructural reforms, any portion of land that cannot be used 
safely is a wasted opportunity for local residents. To this end, ITF is 
determined to continue its work in SEE, coordinating mine action 
activities, victim assistance, and mine risk education projects with 
respect to national and regional goals. However, in order for Serbia 
to achieve APBMC obligations, continuous donor support is crucial. 
The mine action process is vital for all spheres of daily life as well as 
the local and national development strategy. 
See endnotes page 70
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by Roly Evans
[ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] 
In June and July 1945, two Royal Canadian Engineer officers, on their own initiative, carried out a review of the ongoing minefield clearance in Holland. The local military authori-ties deemed the review to be of significant value and there-
fore directed the Military Operational Research Unit to take up the 
study and “carry out a complete survey and analysis of all aspects 
of minefield clearance and casualties.”1 The study, entitled Military 
Operational Research Unit Report No.7 – Minefield Clearance and 
Casualties, Holland 1945, was initially intended to gather lessons 
about minefield clearance casualties in relation to combat. It became 
a significant study of demining during peace time. The resulting fifty-
seven page document remains one of the best analyses of minefield 
clearance, time, and resulting casualties ever conducted. Arguably, it 
has not been equaled or surpassed since. To this day, few in mine ac-
tion are even aware of it.
Mine Clearance in the Netherlands
As in other liberated European countries, wide-ranging mine 
clearance in the Netherlands started remarkably quickly after the ces-
sation of hostilities on 7 May 1945.2 Some limited clearance, mainly 
of routes, had taken place in southern Holland during the previous 
winter; however, concerted efforts only started when the occupy-
ing German 25th Army surrendered. By 20 May 1945, the Canadian 
and British military authorities, represented by the Allied 6th Army 
Headquarters, had overseen the formation of the German Draeger 
Brigade, named after its commander, Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant 
Colonel) Rudolf Draeger. The brigade’s 105 officers and 3,244 other 
ranks were formed from seven pioneer (engineer) battalions, a bat-
talion of fortress troops already stationed in Holland and some other 
Lessons from the Past:
Minefield Clearance and 
Casualties – Holland 1945
– Military Operational Research  
   Unit Report No.7
Image 1. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 – 
Minefield Clearance and Casualties front cover. 
Image courtesy of The National Archives.
Image 2. Oberstleutnant Rudolf Draeger briefs Captain Misseldine, 
Royal Engineers, on clearance in the Hook of Holland area, August 
1944. Draeger was widely deemed to have commanded the clear-
ance efforts in a highly competent manner, albeit his soldiers, cat-
egorized as Surrendered Enemy Personnel rather than prisoners 
of war, sustained casualties that would be unacceptable in mod-
ern mine action.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.
Image 3. Draeger Brigade personnel count disarmed S-Mines be-
side a road in the Hook of Holland, August 1945. By this time, 
the clearance of mines from the Atlantic Wall minefields was 
nearing completion. Units of the Draeger Brigade had started to 
move south of the River Mass to clear minefields on the old win-
ter frontline between the Allies and the Germans. Accounting for 
11.8 percent of all mines found, 127,591 S-Mines were eventually 
removed by the Draeger Brigade in 1945. Relative to the number 
removed, the S-Mine was known to cause the highest fatality rate 
during accidents.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.
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assorted units. Notably, given the subsequent casualties, a German 
military hospital and staff at Bloemendaal, west of Amsterdam, was 
included within the organization of the brigade from the beginning.3
The Draeger Brigade would be responsible for the vast majority of 
mine clearance in the Netherlands. Of the 1,377,898 mines cleared by 
23 November 1947, the Draeger Brigade had cleared 1,079,857 mines 
by as early as 31 December 1945.4 Some assistance was provided by 
the Netherland Mine Clearance and Bomb Disposal Company (BD) 
along with the 2nd Dogs Platoon, Royal Engineers (British Army). 
Dutch members of the Waffen SS imprisoned in a former concentra-
tion camp in Vught, near ‘s-Hertogenbosch, given the opportunity of 
better treatment if they participated, were also involved in clearance 
in the south of Holland.5 
The Draeger Brigade established its headquarters in Delft, be-
tween Rotterdam and The Hague. Work concentrated on the north-
ern half of the country until August 1945, with most effort focused 
on clearing the Atlantic Wall minefields on the coast. By October, all 
Draeger Brigade units had moved south of the river Maas to clear the 
minefields that resulted from the fighting between the Allies and the 
Germans. A replacement German military hospital at Sterksel, near 
Eindhoven, was placed under the Draeger Brigade’s responsibility at 
this time. On 1 October 1945, the Dutch Mijn Opruimings Dienst 
(Mine Clearance Service, MOD) took control of demining operations 
in Holland. Eventually approximately 1,800,000 landmines would be 
cleared in the Netherlands, some 422,102 cleared by the Dutch.6
The Pioneer Battalions worked extremely fast, especially when 
compared with modern day clearance efforts. In part they were en-
abled to do this by the generally excellent minefield records kept by 
the 25th Army. One example is Minefield 235 Goldfisch, (renamed 
Minefield 20 in Dutch records) in The Hague. The minefield of nine-
hundred 270 mm artillery projectiles (Geschossminen), adapted to 
be mines by fitting T.Mi.Z.29 pressure fuzes (which had anti-person-
nel and anti-tank weight settings), was laid by the Pioneer Battalion 
of the 719th Infantry Division in five days during 18–22 April 
1944. Covering an area of 87,688 sq m (104,874 sq yd) with a 194 m 
(212.2 yd) depth and 452 m (494.3 yd) frontage, it was cleared by a 
Image 4. Minenplan 235 Goldfisch, 2 May 1944, showing 900 Granatminen improvised from 270 mm artillery projectiles and T.Mi.Z.29 
pressure fuzes. Artillery projectiles fuzed in this way were common as early anti-tank mines during World War I. As with many Wehrmacht 
minefield records, to the quality and detail of this record enabled rapid clearance after the end of the conflict. The minefield of 87,688 
sq m (104,874 sq yd) was cleared in two days by a Fallschirmjäger pioneer platoon in late July 1944. 
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, the Netherlands.
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Fallschirmjäger pioneer platoon in just two days, 26–27 July 1945.7 
Clearance of nearly 9 ha (22 ac) and nine-hundred mines in two days 
would rightly not be repeated in modern mine action, where such a 
task would take many months. Such speed underlines the urgency of 
the task and the risks that members of the Draeger Brigade were ex-
pected to undertake. The location of this minefield today now forms 
the playing fields of the International School in The Hague.
Collection and Quality Control of Data
One particular aspect of the demining operations in Holland was 
the great emphasis placed on recording and checking data. Both the 
official 6th Army Confidential Report and the Military Operational 
Research Unit Report No.7 detail at length the procedures followed. 
First, all minefield records were checked, assigned serial numbers, 
and drawn onto linen map traces by a Royal Engineers Intelligence 
Section attached to 66 Field Company Royal Engineers prior to clear-
ance.8 A color-coding system to denote German or Allied mine-
fields was adopted: green for Allied, blue for German. Copies of all 
maps were then bound in book form. An accompanying “Schedule 
of Minefields” was developed, recording all known details to comple-
ment the maps. Records were duplicated into a field copy and a mas-
ter copy. Minefield maps were issued to clearance teams from June 
1945 onwards. By 9 October 1945, 4,522 minefields had been regis-
tered in this way. Eventually 5,400 minefields and 900 areas contami-
nated with explosive remnants of war (ERW) would be registered in 
Holland by 1947.9 Ten book sets covered the whole of the Netherlands. 
Further to this overview, individual minefield maps and the 
remaining German records made up 
minefield files that were completed when 
the clearance certificate was added. All 
documents moved under careful control 
with the dispatch and receipt recorded 
in an index book. Importantly, field and 
master copies were carefully compared at 
the end of the process for discrepancies or 
irregularities as they were termed; essen-
tially a form of data quality control not 
always present in modern mine action.10 
For the period July–November 1945, time 
spent clearing in minefields was also 
carefully recorded in other forms with 
comparisons between units and sites 
made to check for irregularities.11 
6th Army HQ itself also recorded all 
casualty data using a simple standard-
ized pro-forma split into a section detail-
ing the circumstances of an accident and 
a section detailing injuries. Staff officers 
sought casualty data wherever it could be 
found, whether from unit medical offi-
cers, civilian doctors, or hospital records. 
Corroboration of forms was made by in-
terviewing witnesses and by examination 
of the returned forms against unit dai-
ly records.12 This careful and detailed approach to operational data, 
very briefly outlined here, while unglamorous, was essential to the 
subsequent operational analysis. 
Image 5. Mine Map Book record of minefields in the Hague. Minenplan 235 Goldfisch is numbered 
Minefield 20 and can be seen among the large rectangular minefields in the southwest corner of the 
image. The minefield site is now the playing fields of the International School of The Hague.
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, the Netherlands.
Image 6. By 1947, 5,400 minefields and 900 areas were registered 
by the authorities in Holland. The red dots in this image indicate 
where minefields were found. Broadly the minefields can be di-
vided into two categories; those on the coast forming part of the 
Atlantic Wall, and those in the areas of the September 1944 until 
May 1945 front lines. The latter tend to be near the Rivers Maas 
and Waal, from eastern Holland to the coast.
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal, the Netherlands.
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Time Study
No study in mine action has ever recorded the man hours expend-
ed versus the mines removed on the scale of Military Operational 
Research Unit Report No.7. Trials were conducted of manual mine 
clearance methods in Moamba, Mozambique, from October to 
November 2004, and while the record of this is more detailed in some 
respects, it was a severely limited trial, not an analysis of a work sam-
ple as large as in Holland in 1945. 
The study of “time and labor factors” in 1945 allowed an analysis 
for each battalion of the man hours expended per 100 mines lifted. 
This ranged from 57 to 78 hours—a difference of up to 27 percent 
between units, usually explained by the different concentration of 
mines between minefields rather than differences in operational effi-
ciency. The more concentrated minefields required fewer man hours 
to remove an equivalent number of mines.13
The time spent removing different mine types was also calculat-
ed. Metal anti-tank Tellerminen required on average 56 man hours 
to remove 100 mines. Wooden, anti-personnel Schuminen, almost 
Image 7. 6th Army HQ Minefield Map trace between the villages of Dreumel and Wamel on the Waal river, west of Nijmegen. German 
minefields are represented in blue, Allied minefields in green. As minefields were cleared, the polygons would be colored in. A field 
and HQ copy of this and associated documents existed, one being used to check the other for discrepancies. This was a small part of 
what was in effect a larger data quality management system that enabled the subsequent operational research contained in Military 
Operational Research Unit Report No.7. (The information on this map does not relate to any current clearance of minefields in this 
area). The National Archives (TNA) PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clear-
ance and casualties. p.42.
Image 8. This table and similar ones in the Report No.7 (Table 
5, p.17) underline the benefits of accurate reporting supported 
by appropriate data quality control systems. Those overseeing 
clearance in the Netherlands in the post-war years often had 
much better information about what was found and in what con-
dition than we do in many cases today. Which national author-
ity or even clearance organization could produce such statistics 
now? WO 205/1186: Confidential Report on Mine Clearance in the 
Netherlands. Appendix F.
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Image 9. Draeger Brigade personnel count disarmed Tellermine-43s beside a road in the 
Hook of Holland, August 1945. 200,456 Tellermines of all types were eventually removed 
by the Draeger Brigade in 1945, a total representing 18.6 percent of all mines found. 
The Tellermine-43 would be copied by the Yugoslav Army as the TMM-1 and would later 
be found during the 1990s conflicts in the Balkans.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.
Image 10. 6th Army HQ were able to use the casualty and mines found returns to plot the respective figures in two comparative 
graphs. The graph underlines the significant casualties sustained by each sub unit of the Draeger Brigade and how casualties were 
broadly proportional to the number of mines removed, albeit with the notable exception of the 346th Pioneer Battalion, which lifted 
approximately 55,000 mines but had the highest casualty figures, greater than units that lifted up to four times more mines. The 
346th Pioneer Battalion was employed for a considerable time in the area of Arnhem clearing “unrecorded or scattered” Schumine 
minefields. WO 205/1186: Confidential Report on Mine Clearance in the Netherlands. Appendix I.
impossible to find with the detectors of 
the day, required on average 70 hours. The 
Riegelminen 43, required on average 97 man 
hours to remove 100 mines, most likely be-
cause deminers were extremely wary since 
wiring within the fuze mechanism could 
function easily on handling due to the effects 
of corrosion. In Holland in 1945, the Draeger 
Brigade removed, on average, a Tellerminen 
every 34 working minutes, and a Schuminen 
every 42 working minutes. The fastest time 
recorded in a given week for a minimum 
sample of 1,000 mines was 15 working min-
utes for a Tellerminen and 20 minutes for a 
Schuminen.14 Whether using the averages or 
the fastest times recorded, this speed of dem-
ining is well outside of modern norms, even 
in circumstances such as the dense minefield 
patterns in Sri Lanka.
Analysis of Mines Found
The Draeger Brigade’s conscientious re-
porting also allowed a good overview of ex-
plosive devices found. For example, careful 
records were kept of what mines were booby-
trapped, what mines were assessed as being 
in a condition that made them unable to det-
onate and which mines had been damaged by 
the weather or corrosion. Less than 1 percent 
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of the main anti-tank mines, Tellerminen and Holzminen, were booby-trapped, 2.33 percent of 
S-Minen, and 2.97 percent of Riegelminen. This was less than the military authorities were ex-
pecting, having become used to German booby-trapping during the later years of the conflict. 
Seven decades before the current studies of landmine aging, a relatively detailed analysis was 
made in Holland in 1945. Ground conditions were characterized into three categories: sandy/
Image 11. A Dutch sailor guards two members of the Kriegsmarine as they remove Tellerminen-
42s from an Atlantic Wall beach minefield. Dependent on which time period is used, between 
0.87 and 1.7 percent Tellerminen were recorded as booby-trapped with anti-lift devices in 
Holland. The image underlines the lack of basic safety precautions taken by most units at 
the time, be it PPE or working/safety distances. Units that reduced the number of individu-
als working in close proximity tended to have lower casualty rates.
Image courtesy of Beeldbank WO2 – NIOD.
Image 12. No.2 Dogs Platoon checking the railway line between Eindhoven and Venlo, 25 
November 1944. The report surmised the belief that dogs were “not 100% effective” and that 
it was decided to use them to search long stretches of railway line and under high tension 
cables. Dogs were not used as a search asset in areas known to be mined.
Image courtesy of the Imperial War Museum.
dry earth, low-lying meadows, and polder-
land flooded since the mines were laid. The 
respective aging characteristics of casings, ig-
niters, or fuzes and detonators for metal and 
wooden mines were noted in each of these 
conditions. The report found that wooden 
mines were unsurprisingly the most vulner-
able to weathering, with 20 percent deemed 
damaged. Anti-handling devices, especial-
ly cocked striker pull fuzes, were particu-
larly prone due to “damp penetrating the 
firing cap and rusting the spring.” Indeed, 
aside from what casing was used for the mine 
(metal being more resilient than wood), the 
chief cause of probable failure of a device was 
“the high percentage of ineffective igniters.”15 
This is consistent with recent studies of mine 
functionality in the Falkland Islands, where 
of a sample of 100 P4B mine fuzes, only one 
was found to be functional.16
Analysis of Accidents 
and Casualties
The Draeger Brigade sustained 563 casu-
alties from 290 accidents in 1945, an aver-
age casualty rate of 17.5 percent of its final 
strength. There were 165 fatalities, 29 per-
cent of all casualties. Casualty rates for its 
sub-units ranged from 6.1 to 29.6 percent.17 
The landmines or other explosive hazards 
involved in accidents were strictly recorded 
allowing an analysis of the respective risk of 
different mine types. Of the 563 casualties 
from 290 accidents, 391 casualties came from 
201 anti-personnel mine accidents, 69 per-
cent of each respective total. In terms of acci-
dents proportional to mines lifted, bounding 
fragmentation S-Mines proved to have the 
highest fatality rate amongst anti-personnel 
mines. This corresponded to anecdotal ex-
perience of combat where soldiers routinely 
feared the S-Mine for the number of casual-
ties it could cause over a relatively wide area. 
Even today bounding fragmentation mines 
tend to require enhanced safety distances 
during clearance operations. While there 
were significantly fewer anti-tank mine ac-
cidents (31 percent), when they did happen 
fatality rates were high as would be expect-
ed given the higher net explosive quantities 
involved.18 The mean number of casualties 
per accident ranged between 1.62 for the 
Schuminen to 2.32 for the S-mine, with an 
average for all types being 1.94.19 Safety or 
working distances were not introduced dur-
ing these clearance operations, and it is dif-
ficult to understand why such a simple safety 
measure was not employed.
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Units were given a high degree of discretion in how they went 
about clearing the minefields and considerable differences in proce-
dure existed amongst them. The Battalion GROH, made up of former 
“fortress troops” manning the Atlantic Wall, stated that there were 
“never more than four men in any one mine-lifting party.” Whereas 
in Battalion 526, twenty men could be “prodding and lifting in the 
same row of mines.” The average size of mine clearance party working 
in close proximity to each other in the Draeger Brigade was seven oth-
er ranks and one NCO.20 Battalion 526 had the third highest casualty 
rate, Battalion GROH the lowest.21 Procedure was not the only expla-
nation for casualty rates however, as the graph reproduced at Image 
10 makes clear. In general the more mines a unit cleared the more ca-
sualties they had. As in modern mine action, explanations for given 
indicators could often be multi-faceted.
Schuminen were the most common mine of any type found in the 
Netherlands, with 229,431 cleared in 1945 alone.22 Despite some met-
al content, the mine was very difficult to find using the detectors of 
the day and effectively posed the same hazard to deminers as more 
modern minimal metal mines. Schuminen were normally detect-
ed using a standing prodding drill. This proved to be inappropriate 
and dangerous. Resulting injuries to the face and eyes from primary 
and secondary fragmentation were common, with rudimentary eye 
protection proving only partially effective. This prodding drill often 
missed Schuminen with casualties caused by stepping on them usu-
ally resulting in an amputation of the leg.
What was also significant about the Military Operational Research 
Unit Report No. 7 was how casualty data could be analyzed in contect 
of the good quality operational reporting overall. For example, the 
study could calculate the number of mines lifted for each accident and 
for each casualty by battalion. The figures for the eight units ranged 
between the 20th Pioneer Battalion, who lifted 5,500 mines per ac-
cident and 2,720 mines per casualty (40 accidents), and the 346th 
Pioneer Battalion who lifted 1,240 mines per accident and 580 mines 
per casualty (49 accidents). For all the eight battalions there was a 
rank correlation of 0.71 between the number of mines lifted per ac-
cident and the number of casualties per accident.23 This could be ex-
plained by the differing working procedures in the field between units. 
However, there were other explanations. The 20th Pioneer Battalion 
tended to clear well-marked and recorded Atlantic Wall minefields; 
the 346th Pioneer Battalion was employed for a considerable time in 
the area of Arnhem clearing “unrecorded or scattered” Schuminen 
minefields. It is believed context such as this was important in under-
standing the difference in performance. As with all performance in-
dicators, the key was to use the evidence as the starting point to seek 
further explanation. In short, the statistics allowed those in charge to 
ask the right questions. The same principle applies when using statis-
tics and key performance indicators in mine action today.
The study also contained recommendations concerning the use of 
dogs in demining operations that resonate with experience in modern 
mine action. The requirements for practice on dummy minefield and 
the need for rest days in order to maintain the “interest of both dogs 
and men” were deemed essential. Handlers needed to demonstrate 
“care and patience.” While dogs had uses, they were deemed “not 
100% effective.” It was decided that the dogs were not reliable enough 
to be used on known minefields but were better suited to “routine 
checking of suspect areas and the proving of and delimiting of areas 
in which mines were rumored to exist.” 155 miles of railway line, 73 
miles under high tension cables, and 77,000 sq yd (64,382 sq m) were 
searched by “war dogs” with 29 mines being found in this way. Dogs 
were “fully justified on large areas of non-metallic anti-personnel 
mines.”24 Much of this experience is reflected in the modern Animal 
Detection Systems IMAS, where it is recognized that a concentration 
of explosive targets can confuse dogs, and the need for strict accredi-
tation of both handler and mine detection dog is mandated.25
Conclusion
This brief summary of the Military Operational Research Unit 
Report No.7 has given only a limited overview. The detail the report 
was able to marshal is only partially reflected.
A number of German personnel continued clearance in Holland 
for another two years. The last 19 German Surrendered Enemy 
Personnel were sent back to the British Army of the Rhine for demo-
bilization on the 3rd of October 1947. The final total of German casu-
alties for both mine and ERW clearance in the Netherlands was 650. 
Of these 225 (34 percent) were fatal casualties. Eighty-three Dutch 
clearance personnel were also killed during the clearance effort of 
their country.26
Much was done poorly during the clearance efforts in Holland in 
1945. Casualties were very high, unacceptably high by modern stan-
dards, and the treatment of German Surrendered Enemy Personnel 
remains contentious to this day. Clearance techniques were often ru-
dimentary and safety precautions were often casual. Modern mine 
action has in many ways improved significantly on the technical de-
mining ability of those who went before us in the post-war years, with 
better on-site procedures and personal protective equipment.
However, the limitations of the 1945 efforts should be seen in the 
context of what was done well, and even what was done better. The 
military authorities in Holland were ahead of their time in terms of 
analyzing their own operations, be it in relation to the use of mine de-
tection dogs, aging of landmines, time studies, recording of devices 
found or the recording of casualties. Data collection and analysis was 
in many ways superior in 1945 than during much of modern mine ac-
tion. Quality management of data in particular is an aspect where ar-
guably we have still not caught up. We can do better. We owe it as a 
sector to the deminers risking their lives daily in the field to do so. 
See endnotes page 71
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N o one knows for sure how frequently accidents occur in humanitarian demining. This is partly because the details of accidents involving state employees are rarely shared, and national laws 
often restrict access to police or military reports. It is also be-
cause there is a frequent failure to comply with the report-
ing requirements described in the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS). IMAS 10.60 requires that “an accident 
in which a mine, ERW or explosives harms a demining em-
ployee, visitor, or member of the local population” shall be in-
vestigated and the report made available. However, although 
it is a requirement to share the results of investigations, it is 
currently not entirely clear with whom the results should be 
shared. Many accident reports were included in the Database 
of Demining Accidents (DDAS) between 1995 and 2011, but 
few have been shared recently.
Not having all the data means that it is not possible to provide 
a well-informed estimate of accident frequency. The only known 
study of accident frequency was conducted twenty years ago in 
Afghanistan, when all insurance records were made available 
along with all work schedules.2 The statistics on accident fre-
quency presented in this article derive from the Afghanistan 
study; all other statistics discussed are from the DDAS. 
The number of hours worked, number of deminers actually 
in the field, and the number of reported accidents and insur-
ance claims were all made available. The results of the study 
indicated that we might expect one severely injurious accident 
per 32 field deminers every year. However, this ratio may be 
misleading. The working context, the explosive hazards pres-
ent, and the equipment available all have an impact on acci-
dent frequency, quite apart from the quality of the training or 
the supervision at any worksite.
Accidents and Field 
Medical Provision 
Image 1. A typical field-medic’s bag.
All images copyright of the author or public domain (having been published online in the DDAS for more than ten years).
Image 2. A stretcher being used to transport recovered 
mines in a minefield in Zimbabwe.1
FIELD NOTES
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The data available to the Afghanistan study included all in-
surance claims, including those that were not related to ex-
plosive events. Perhaps surprisingly, there were more claims 
related to non-explosive events than there were for explosive-
related injuries. The study also found that the consequences of 
all medical emergencies were sometimes profoundly affected 
by the level of medical and medevac provision that was avail-
able, a situation that has not changed. 
IMAS 10.40 covers medical support to demining opera-
tions. It requires demining organizations to “be properly 
trained and equipped to respond to demining accidents,” but 
the medical support that it suggests is usually recommend-
ed, not required, because what can be reasonably achieved 
can depend on the context. Among the limited IMAS 10.40 
requirements that IMAS compliant organizations must pro-
vide at each worksite are skilled medics, appropriate casualty 
transport, an efficient means of communication, and an acci-
dent response plan tailored for each worksite. A study of the 
DDAS accident records provides strong evidence that these 
are reasonable requirements.
Features that influence the outcome of an accident are not 
always causes of the accident. However, features can be things 
that make the consequences of the accident worse. An inad-
equate medical provision is noted in 14 percent of recorded 
accidents, but there are no records in which a trained med-
ic gave inappropriate treatment. In some cases there was no 
trained or appropriately-equipped medic, in others, there was 
no ambulance vehicle, communications system, or medevac 
plan. In several, the casualty was taken to a medical facility 
that lacked the capacity to treat their injuries.
The Provision of Skilled  
Medics
Most of a field medic’s daily responsibilities involve pro-
viding mundane medications and first aid to the team, and 
sometimes to the community where they work. The rarity of 
demining accidents means that many medics have never seen 
a severe demining accident, so their ability to respond appro-
priately depends heavily on their training and experience pri-
or to working in humanitarian mine action. 
In Image 1, the field medic’s bag contains medicines that are 
fairly typical. Most are for everyday medical problems rather 
than injury because the medic often acts as the team doctor as 
well as a trauma paramedic. The drugs shown are common an-
tibiotics, anti-flatulence drugs, and treatment for infected gums 
and anxiety disorders. A well-equipped medic will also have all 
the equipment necessary to respond to a traumatic injury.
Accidents in the working area are rare, so medics often 
spends many hours sitting and watching the other team mem-
bers work each day. However, they have to be ready to react 
swiftly and professionally if an emergency occurs, and the 
DDAS accident records show that they have almost always 
done this well. Medics have been a casualty in almost two 
percent of all accidents recorded in the DDAS, and in four of 
these accidents the medic died. Six of these accidents involved 
other casualties who the injured medic was unable to treat.
To avoid risk to medics, some demining organizations re-
quire them to stay outside the working area while a casualty 
is brought to them. Other organizations allow the medic to go 
to the casualty as long as they always walk in safe areas. There 
appears to be no advantage in preventing the medic from go-
ing directly to the casualty, because most of the explosive- 
related accidents involving medics occurred in areas that were 
believed to be safe. To reduce the risks associated with the 
medic being accidentally incapacitated, some organizations 
employ skilled medical assistants and, following the IMAS, 
most organizations train all deminers in basic first aid.
Appropriate Casualty 
Transportation
Appropriate transportation is often a well-equipped ambu-
lance, but certain contexts may require a boat or a helicopter. 
Whatever the vehicle, it must be available to transport a casu-
alty without delay. While some injuries are obvious and treat-
ment can begin in the field, other life-threatening trauma can 
only be diagnosed and treated after reaching a well-equipped 
medical facility. The medevac vehicle must also be appropri-
ately fitted and equipped to carry the casualty securely, often 
over rough ground.
Image 3. A demining vehicle after a road traffic accident, 
a common cause of deminer injury.
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The demining ambulance shown on the left in Image 4 
is obviously not a safe means of transporting casualties. By 
contrast, the demining ambulance shown on the right is ad-
equately equipped, but only for one casualty. In over 12 per-
cent of recorded demining accidents, there has been more 
than one casualty.
In insecure areas, some demining groups always send a 
back-up vehicle with an ambulance to provide assistance in 
case of trouble en route. Other demining organizations have 
used different approaches with the deminers’ transport vehi-
cle also functioning as the ambulance. In one of these cases, 
a Land Rover being used as both transport vehicle and ambu-
lance was carrying eight people when it was driven into the 
working area and parked on top of an anti-tank mine that had 
Image 5. A converted vehicle capable of carrying two 
casualties.
Image 4. The standard of ambulances used in demining varies from a mattress thrown into the back of a vehicle (left) 
to hygienic and well-equipped vehicle conversions (right).
Image 6. A well-equipped demining ambulance with space 
for only one incapacitated casualty.
been missed during previous searches. The only means of 
communication was a radio that was destroyed in the explo-
sion. There was no other vehicle, so no ambulance or medic. 
Two deminers died at the scene and two others died while 
being transported to hospital in a flat-bed truck and in four-
wheel-drive vehicles owned by the public. Their unplanned 
journey took more than seven hours.3
In another accident in which the ambulance was being used 
as a transport vehicle, it was travelling along a road believed 
safe when an anti-tank mine detonated under a rear wheel, 
and its long-range fuel tank caught fire.4 Three deminers died 
and seven were injured, including both medics, one of them 
severely. By chance, another demining group working nearby 
was able to send their medic and ambulance to help.
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As well as providing a dedicated vehicle, organizations 
should ensure ambulances are equipped to be as comfort-
able as possible for the casualty and to allow treatment to 
continue during transit. In another recorded accident, a se-
verely injured casualty was safely loaded into the ambulance 
before the driver crashed into a tree as he turned the vehi-
cle around.5 The impact threw an unsecured oxygen bottle 
across the back of the ambulance hitting the medic on the 
head, inflicting severe brain injuries.
A well-equipped ambulance with securely-fitted oxygen 
bottles like that shown in Image 6 cannot have the seating 
to safely transport a demining team and their equipment. 
The provision of a skilled medic and a single dedicated 
well-equipped ambulance may not be 
enough when there are multiple casual-
ties. All demining organizations should 
be encouraged to practice medevac in-
volving several simultaneous casual-
ties so that the medics become familiar 
with the assessment and prioritization 
of multiple trauma injuries. 
In another accident, the demining 
transport truck in Image 8 was car-
rying 25 people when it detonated a 
mine while driving to the worksite.6 
Fortunately the organization’s ambu-
lance vehicle was following behind. To 
ensure that there were no more mines, 
search and clearance were conducted at 
the same time as emergency treatment 
was given to eight injured people. The 
medic immediately made a radio re-
quest for assistance because there were 
too many casualties to be transported 
in the ambulance. Uninjured deminers 
reacted with self-discipline, searching for other mines while 
their colleagues were being stabilized, and a second am-
bulance arrived quickly. The team had practiced medevac 
procedures involving multiple casualties so they were well 
prepared to react professionally.
The accident record provides abundant evidence that a 
dedicated ambulance vehicle and medic are needed. There is 
also evidence that ambulances should not be used to trans-
port deminers and should not be driven into the worksite. 
The record also provides evidence of the need for more than 
one means of communication at every worksite and a well- 
rehearsed medevac plan that covers the possibility of there 
being multiple casualties.
Image 7. A demining ambulance, after casualties were re-
moved, that detonated an anti-tank mine with its rear left 
wheel while being used as a transport vehicle.4 Image 8. A demining transport truck that detonated a 
landmine en route to the worksite.
Image 9. The picture shows deminers carrying a casualty down a mountain to 
the nearest road and the ambulance.7
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All Reasonable Effort
What is considered reasonable will often depend where the 
worksite is. If medevac starts far from maintained roads or 
the nearest viable hospital, it cannot be conducted at an ideal 
speed but, knowing that the work will be conducted remote-
ly, other provisions can be enhanced to reduce the impact 
of any delay. The team’s medic(s) should have the necessary 
skills to diagnose, stabilize, and treat those in their care dur-
ing lengthy transit and there must be enough medical equip-
ment and consumables to meet all predictable needs. When it 
is known that alternative medics will not be readily available, 
trained medical assistants should always be available in case 
the medic becomes ill or is injured. Senior managers should 
maintain a detailed medevac exercise record and ensure that 
the provisions are optimized to prevent the medevac itself 
from making things worse for the casualty.
To comply with the IMAS, practiced medevac plans and 
proven communications systems must be in place, however 
remote the worksite, and coordination between all those who 
may be involved in an evacuation must be established before 
work in the hazardous area starts.
Whether by road, air, or river, medevac exercises should 
be conducted to give confidence that all reasonable effort has 
been made to recognize and overcome potential problems. 
Conducting medevac exercises should be a priority for new 
teams, or when starting work in new areas. 
The Need to Share Accident 
Reports
For more information about the events surrounding the 
accidents mentioned in this article, please see the DDAS re-
cord number of each event as referenced in the endnotes. The 
Image 10. Around the world, the medevac varies from helicopter airlift to a relay of boats 
and vehicles.
A.V. Smith (AVS, Andy Smith) began work-
ing in humanitarian mine action (HMA) in 
1995 in Mozambique. He has since worked 
in HMA in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kosovo, Libya, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Palau, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe. He was 
the founder of the Database of Demining 
Accidents (DDAS) and served on the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) Review Board for 11 years. In addition to devel-
oping demining personal protective equipment (PPE), he has worked 
at all levels in HMA from surveyor/deminer to NGO program man-
ager and Chief Technical Advisor to UNDP country programs and is 
currently a research associate at the University of Genoa.
Andy Smith
AVS Mine Action Consultants
Website: www.nolandmines.com
DDAS is now a part of the demining Accident and Incident 
Database (AID) housed in James Madison University’s Global 
CWD Repository (https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-dda/). 
Its records provide many real-life examples in support of 
training and risk management. However, it is far from com-
plete, which is unfortunate because the more detailed ac-
cident reports that it contains, the more use it can be. This 
article proves that even old reports can provide useful evi-
dence of what works and what does not, so all accident and in-
cident reports should be shared. Please send any accident and 
incident reports that you have for inclusion in AID to cisr-re-
porting@jmu.edu. Names and identifiers are always redact-
ed so that no organization or individual suffers for sharing 
information that may help others avoid injury or death, and 
which supports the professional development of risk manage-
ment in humanitarian demining. 
See endnotes page 71
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B ooby-traps are designed to entice victims to per-form a physical action with an apparently harm-less object that hides an explosive device that leads to the device’s unexpected initiation. Many 
booby-traps are improvised explosives devices (IED) and fea-
ture some kind of bait targeted to exploit emotions and the 
anticipated actions of security forces or civilians, who will 
initiate the explosive device in close proximity. Baiting is de-
signed to attract attention and cause the victim to approach 
the IED. It is intended to pique curiosity or instinctual feel-
ings, such as the desire to help (bait in the form of a body or 
an injured person), to profit (financial bait), longing (booby-
trapped dolls used as bait in the Vietnam War), or those of 
honor and patriotism (using flags to lure soldiers to a device). 
Many booby-traps feature some kind of bait designed to 
lure bomb disposal personnel closer to an IED and, in do-
ing so, cause them to inadvertently step on a pressure plate. 
Other traps entice the victim to perform a physical action 
with an IED that will lead to its initiation, for example tam-
pering with objects, such as flags or even weapons stockpiles 
abandoned by the enemy or competing forces. Anti-lift and 
anti-handling devices can also be improvised from other 
explosive devices and create a hidden danger for explosive 
ordnance disposal personnel. Such devices are often used in 
conjunction with anti-vehicle mines to prevent tampering 
with or removal of the mine.  
On 17 February 2018, a booby-trapped Palestinian flag 
was planted along the Israel-Gaza border fence, east of the 
city of Khan Yunis. An Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) officer 
approached the flag to remove it from the border fence and 
was injured when it exploded as he laid it on the ground. 
The flag pole was booby-trapped with a victim-operated IED 
(VOIED), designed to initiate when the flag pole was tilted. 
The flag served as bait to draw in the victim (the IDF soldier). 
Dozens of Palestinian flags are removed from the border 
fence on a daily basis without incident, causing the soldier 
to perceive this item as not dangerous, lowering the soldier’s 
Booby-traps and 
Anti-handling Devices: 
by Michael Cardash [ Terrogence ]
Gaza border, 17 February 2018. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
mindfulness to the inherent dangers of these items that appear 
seemingly-harmless. Attempting to exploit mundane military 
or demining routines that invite complacency and reduce alert-
ness among those who are being targeted for attack is a tactic 
utilized by terror organizations around the world. Using a weap-
on or ammunition as bait in a booby-trap is one of the simplest 
COMMON TACTICS
FIELD NOTES
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traps to assemble. This tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) 
is known the world over and is considered a “classic.” 
On 28 September 2017, a Saudi Arabian soldier was report-
edly wounded while neutralizing a mine planted by Houthi 
rebels near the southern border with Yemen. Video footage of 
the incident reveals the attempted neutralization and the mo-
ment the mine detonated. The documentation shows the Saudi 
soldier attempting to neutralize a TM-62 anti-tank mine. 
After unscrewing and removing the fuze, the soldier next rais-
es the body of the mine, after which an explosion is heard. 
Upon closer examination, a lever can be discerned in the sand 
under the mine after the soldier picks it up, and a distinct click 
can be heard, followed a few seconds later by the blast. The 
anti-tank mine seems to have been fitted with a simple, im-
provised anti-handling device in the form of a hand grenade 
placed under the mine with its safety pin removed, with the 
weight of the mine holding the lever in place.
The use of grenades as anti-handling devices is one of the 
simplest types of such devices taught around the world, used 
in the military in various improvisation situations and in in-
structional manuals produced and disseminated by terrorist 
organizations. In the jihadi arena, there are instructional vid-
eos showing how to extract the delay element from time delay 
fuzes for immediate detonation.
In April 2013, a jihadi forum member published a Lebanese 
Hezbollah instructional video on how to make a booby-trap 
or anti-handling device with grenades. The instructor dem-
onstrates how to remove the grenade delay element, causing 
the grenade to explode immediately upon removal of the safety 
pin, without the usual three-to-four second delay. He then gives 
an example of how to use such a device to booby-trap a corpse.
Using hand grenades for anti-handling devices with mines 
was documented in a video circulated on jihadi forums in 
December 2012; the video depicted training exercises by a 
The soldier raises the body of the mine, a distinct click is heard, and what looks like a lever can be discerned in 
the sand under the body of the mine. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
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group of Syrian rebels called the Mujahideen Brigade, a local 
contingent of the former Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in the Latakia 
area of northwestern Syria. The video presents a practical les-
son as well as hands-on practice in mine laying, where the 
instructor explains the components and operation of a Soviet-
made PMN-1: a pressure-activated, anti-personnel landmine. 
In the video, a grenade is buried in a shallow pit, serving as an 
anti-lift device for the mine then placed on top of it.
On 8 August 2018, the Syrian rebel group Junud al-Sham 
published a video showing a training camp used by the group’s 
fighters. The video shows fighters training how to neutralize 
mines in the field. Additionally, one fighter demonstrates how 
to detect and neutralize a Claymore-type IED hidden in some 
bushes along a footpath, fitted with a pressure-release device 
in the form of a Russian-made grenade fuze with a tripwire 
tied to the safety ring and a grenade—with its safety pin re-
moved—planted underneath the improvised mine.
As previously stated, there are jihadi instructional videos 
showing how to extract the delay element from time-delay 
fuzes for immediate detonation. However, even without re-
moving the delay element, the surprise of hearing the faint 
pop of the exploding primer at start of the four-second delay 
period can catch a soldier or the targeted victim off guard, al-
lowing sufficient time for the grenade or grenade fuze to deto-
nate and cause the desired injury.
Explosive devices targeting bomb disposal experts are usu-
ally secondary systems that are hidden from view. In these 
cases, there may not be any discernible indication from the 
primary system that an additional system exists. In IEDs spe-
cifically designed to target bomb technicians, one or more 
components (the battery, telephone, or wires) is clearly visi-
ble in order to trick technicians into thinking that they have 
neutralized the initiation system or power source. Meanwhile, 
the secondary device is concealed, sometimes completely 
Removing the delay element from the Mk 2 grenade fuze and inserting it under a corpse. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
The grenade, without its safety pin, is planted under the mine and covered with soil, creating an anti-lift device. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
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Neutralizing mines. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
Detecting and neutralizing the booby-trap (grenade) from under the Claymore mine. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
Collection of fully-assembled IEDs comprising mines 
fitted with improvised pressure plates and anti-lift 
boxes, Falluja, Iraq, 2016. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
Al-Karma, Iraq, January 2016. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
Nineveh, Iraq, November 2016. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
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IS anti-tank mines, Al-Ramadi, Iraq, December 2016. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
IS anti-lift firing systems. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
Anti-lift switches used by IS Sinai Province. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
Anti-lift switches used by IS Sinai Province. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
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separated from the primary IED with an independent power 
source, while it actually constitutes an initiation system for 
both the primary and secondary device.
In June 2016, the beleaguered Iraqi city of Fallujah was fi-
nally liberated from the grip of the Islamic State (IS) after a 
month-long offensive. Workshops for the production of vari-
ous IEDs, mortar rounds, rockets, and homemade explosives 
discovered in the city were extensively documented by Iraqi 
Security Forces and the media. Alongside fully-assembled 
IEDs comprising mines and improvised pressure plates were 
white boxes. The purpose of these boxes was to serve as anti-
handling firing systems that would target deminers or bomb 
disposal personnel who would lift up the mine after first neu-
tralizing the improvised pressure plate. Since then, these 
white anti-lift boxes and other anti-lift switches have been 
documented on many occasions and in different regions un-
der the influence of IS.
IS has produced some mines with anti-handling features 
that are externally similar to their single-function, plastic anti- 
tank mines. These mines also have a similar interior to the im-
provised IS anti-tank mine, with a mechanical-pressure fuze 
located at the center of a concave metal plate inside the mine. 
Some of the mines also have a built-in pressure-release switch 
serving as an anti-handling device.
In order to avoid initiation by anti-lift switches and sub-
sequent injury, deminers and bomb disposal personnel must 
always be alert to the possible presence of anti-lift devic-
es and booby-traps when handling IEDs, mines, or any oth-
er ordnance or items that can be used as bait. Precautionary 
measures to prevent unnecessary exposure to anti-handling 
devices should be taken by counter-charging ordnance and 
mines by detonating the devices in situ, remotely pulling the 
device using a “hook and line” technique to negate anti-lift 
or tampering systems, or using penetrating technologies to 
inspect weapons or ammunition, which most commonly in-
volve mobile X-ray systems to determine whether containers’ 
inner contents are legitimate or suspicious. 
IS anti-tank mine with anti-lift switch. 
Images courtesy of CAT IED.
Michael Cardash
Senior C-IED Analyst
Terrogence
Chief Superintendent Michael Cardash, 
the former deputy head of the Israeli 
National Police Bomb Disposal Division, 
has served 27 years as a senior bomb 
technician. During those years he par-
ticipated in numerous missions defeating 
IEDs and other counter-terrorist opera-
tions. He commanded bomb disposal 
units within the Israeli border guards and 
police during intense terrorist conflicts, gaining experience in-
vestigating, and responding to the variety of terror attacks in-
cluding suicide bombing devices and incidents. Cardash currently 
researches global IED incidents, is the Senior C-IED Analyst at 
Terrogence, and authors the Terrogence Möbius C-IED reports, 
which analyze and assess global IED-related technical and tac-
tical intelligence.
IS anti-tank mines, Al-Ramadi, Iraq, December 2016. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
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S ince 2016, the Center for Fire and Explosives, Forensic Investigations, Training and Research at Oklahoma State University (OSU) has teamed up with Golden West Humanitarian 
Foundation to offer a training opportunity to military and 
civilian bomb experts, as well as OSU medical personnel 
and students. During the second half of January 2018, a 
group of civilian law enforcement bomb technicians, mili-
tary explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians, medi-
cal personnel, a lawyer, and educators visited Cambodia to 
participate in the OSU Explosives Ordnance seminar con-
ducted by Golden West. 
Throughout the seminar, numerous topics like exploita-
tion, ordnance, explosives effects, medical treatment, and 
general demolition procedures were discussed and observed. 
Moreover, future technologies in the field of EOD train-
ing aids and field identification were presented to the group. 
The training consisted of an intense week of explosives semi-
nars, life-saving techniques in a jungle environment, and an 
in-depth approach to large-scale inerting and explosive ma-
nipulation. While the days were long and jam-packed with 
information, the experience was incredibly valuable from an 
EOD technician perspective. This article will summarize the 
days’ events and lessons learned. 
History and Additive 
Manufacturing
On Day one participants met Len Austin from Golden 
West Humanitarian Foundation who provided the group with 
a private tour of the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) 
Ordnance Museum. As a former United States Marine Corps 
Master Sergeant EOD technician with over ten years of mine-
action experience working with Golden West in Cambodia, 
the South Pacific, Caribbean, and throughout Asia, Len was a 
valuable guide to explain the vast amounts of ordnance that 
the museum holds, where it came from, and how it was ren-
dered safe. With so much experience and knowledge of the 
area and the types of ordnance used by the United States and 
other countries throughout Cambodia, Len both enriched the 
tour and engaged everyone in attendance. 
Following the CMAC museum tour, Golden West took 
the group to its headquarters in Phnom Penh. Led by one of 
Golden West’s engineers, the group toured Golden West’s 3D 
Advanced Ordnance Teaching Materials (AOTM) manufac-
turing lab, where they create 100-percent, 200-percent, and 
400-percent sized fuzes, landmines, submunitions, and other 
ordnance items. These accurate or oversize munitions func-
tion as training aids for anyone working in the fields of bomb 
disposal, demining, or public safety.  
Toward the end of the day, participants traveled to one of 
the only remaining and most infamous Khmer Rouge prisons 
in Phnom Pehn: the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, commonly 
known as the “S-21 Schoolhouse,” which was an eye-opening 
and somber experience. Participants were fortunate since one 
of the few survivors of the prison was there selling his book. 
Gunnery Sergeant Rivero was lucky enough to speak with him 
and to see how vital telling the history of S-21 was to him.
Technical Overview and 
Manipulating Energetics
Day two began with a two-hour trip down a single-lane 
highway across southern Cambodia to the Kampong Chhnang 
Training Center (KCTC). There the group met Len who famil-
iarized all attendees with the area and gave a safety brief. After 
a short lunch, Len gave participants a tour of the Golden West 
compound and the Explosives Harvesting System (EHS). 
Len explained how the facility supports demining opera-
tions across Cambodia as well as CMAC. Following the brief-
ing and demonstration of the facility, Len demonstrated each 
step in the EHS via stages. First, in the preparation area, 
which is located outside of the cutting house, Len described 
the numerous testing tools that the organization uses for test-
ing friction, drop, and heat. On the display table, Len began to 
explain how all six projectiles present were cut and displayed. 
All six of the items were cut using different methods, so the 
purpose of the display was well founded. 
by Jorge Rivero [ U.S. Marines ] and Tom Gersbeck [ Oklahoma State University ]
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Following this stage of the process, Len took the group to 
the cutting house in which a Russian-made 122 mm high-
explosive (HE) projectile was being prepared for cutting. Len 
spoke about the different modules used in this process, the 
custom-made mounts, and where the machines are made and 
purchased. Throughout the tour, Len’s primary concern was 
safety, and he went into detail on the safety features for the 
whole operation. 
Lastly, the group left the cutting area for the command cen-
ter bunker in which the 122 mm projectile was cut remotely. 
After a short brief on the cut, the group made their way to 
the mixing house. In the mixing house, Len provided a short 
period of instruction on how heat is moved through a multi-
layered housing, which results in a radiant heat melting and 
breaking the adhesion between the body of the ammunition 
and the explosive filler. Upon the explosives reaching their 
melting point, the explosives fall into the catch bin and are 
broken into golf-size balls before moving to the heating con-
tainer. At this point, Len and his staff gave the group a de-
tailed briefing on different explosives used, quality control, 
and what he and his team look for when melting the explo-
sives. Upon completion of this step, the melted explosives are 
poured into a high-heat silicone form, which makes their 100 
gr boosters that the team uses to destroy mines and other un-
exploded ordnance (UXO). 
Technical Approaches 
to Success
Day three began with a short briefing by Len, who then 
led the group to Golden West’s “Elephant Range.” Eight sepa-
rate shots—or detonations—were scheduled, with each shot 
having an ordnance item to be destroyed. Each shot was 
briefed by Golden West staff and primed by its team while the 
students were all accounted for at the bunker. 
Shot one. 1,000 U.S.-made 20 mm HE projectiles were de-
stroyed with the use of Golden West’s NMD liquid explosive. 
This shot was one of the most educational. Experienced EOD 
technicians conduct shots with thousands of pounds of net ex-
plosive weight (NEW). Using bulk explosives like C4 on these 
vast shots causes kick-outs of munition debris more often than 
not. For EOD techs doing large-scale demolition operations, 
kickouts are becoming an even bigger issue due to the U.S. 
moving toward insensitive high explosives. However, Golden 
West uses liquid explosive, and the results of these shots are 
astonishing. The liquid explosive allows for much greater HE-
to-HE contact throughout the process, which significantly re-
duces the probability of kick-outs and therefore reduces the 
Students gather around Dr. Marcel Durocher as he explains dif-
ferent types of demining equipment, how they function, and the 
science behind demining.
All images courtesy of the authors.
Dr. Durocher lectured on geology—surface and subsurface—
and mapping techniques to the class. Throughout the seminar, 
Dr. Durocher provided instructions for eight different types of 
equipment used throughout the demining community.
Two of Austin’s assistants pour liquid explosives into a bag 
containing 1,000 U.S.-made 20 mm HE projectiles. This meth-
od, which Austin explained, significantly reduces the chances 
of “kick-outs” during demolition operations. After completing 
the shot, all participants searched for kick-outs, and none 
were found.
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The 1,000 20 mm HE Projectiles that Austin used on his liquid explosives shot.
Austin from Golden West fills a shaped charge container with 35 ml of NMD liquid 
explosive
Exit hole in 40-mm thick steel plate from the 35-ml NMD shaped charge.
chances of having ordnance scattered 
through a demolition area. With plas-
tic explosives like C4, HE-to-HE contact 
can be achieved on some or most parts of 
the ordnance item but not all. 
Shot two. Five Chinese 60 mm HE 
mortars were filled with dinitronaph-
thalene (DNN) explosives using liq-
uid explosives for the detonation. This 
shot was significant in showing once 
again the power of liquid explosives to 
dispose of DNN, which is known to be 
an incredibly insensitive munition that 
offers substantial problems during the 
disposal phase of EOD operations. 
Shot three. One Russian-made TM-
46 anti-tank landmine containing 5.7 
kg of TNT. For this shot, the 100 gr EHS 
booster was used to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of the explosives. 
Shot four. One Russian-made 122 
mm artillery projectile containing HE 
was detonated. During this shot, anoth-
er 100 gr EHS booster was used to dem-
onstrate its ability to penetrate a ½-inch 
thick plate of steel. 
Shot five. One Chinese-made 120 
mm mortar containing HE was used. 
For this, a 35 gr SEA-91 was used. SEA-
91 is a homemade pliable explosive made 
via the EHS. This shot was once again 
done to demonstrate the ability of these 
EHS products. 
Shot six. One U.S.-made 105 mm 
white phosphorous (WP) projec-
tile was used. Another SEA-91 tool 
was placed in the fuze well to dem-
onstrate destroying WP-filled muni-
tions, which are extremely dangerous 
for EOD technicians. 
Shots seven and eight. These 
shots consisted of 40 mm thick steel 
plates placed on the ground, hit with 
two shots. The shots demonstrated the 
effectiveness of the explosives made at 
the EHS. For the first shot, a 100 gr EHS 
booster was placed touching the plate 
and detonated creating the spalling 
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effect on the plate. The second shot used 35 gr of liquid NMD 
in a container positioned with a standoff of 75 mm and deto-
nated. The precision and penetration of these two charges im-
pressed everyone in attendance. 
After lunch, Golden West’s Dr. Marcel Durocher provided 
classes on geology, surface and subsurface search, and map-
ping techniques. Dr. Durocher also provided instruction on 
eight different types of equipment used throughout the dem-
ining community. 
Interconnections Between 
Victims, Bomb Disposal, 
and Medical Personnel 
Day four began with a safety briefing from Len and 
movement to the Elephant Range. The demonstrations in-
volved two 80-lb pigs due to the close resemblance with the 
human body and ease of acquisition; both pigs were euth-
anized roughly one hour before shots occurred. Having a 
medical doctor and 4th-year medical student within the 
group, the training capitalized on the opportunity to analyze 
the effects of these ordnance items, as the medical person-
nel expertly detailed the external and internal injuries suf-
fered. Three shots were planned in which two would involve 
the pigs, and the third was a quality control shot of the new 
batch of EHS boosters. All students remained in the down-
range safety bunkers while the shots were prepared. 
Shot one. The first pig was in a standing position with 
its rear legs touching the ground and wearing military-style 
boots. A Russian-made PMN-1 anti-personnel blast mine was 
positioned underground beneath the pig’s rear right foot. 
After detonation, Len sent Golden West‘s drone down-
range to ensure it was safe for personnel. Upon arriving on 
site, we saw the pig on the ground with wounds consistent 
with mortal injuries. Once all students were present, Karley 
Koch, a 4th-year medical student at OSU, dissected and 
provided details on the pig’s injuries, severity, and surviv-
ability of those injuries. 
Shot two. The second pig was secured between two small 
trees at a 45-degree angle with a sheet of plywood to its left. A 
Russian-made POMZ fragmentation mine was positioned one 
meter from the pig and 1 ft (0.3 m) off the ground. After det-
onation, the pig was laid on the ground and split open. Koch 
again examined and dissected the pig. While narrating the re-
sults, Koch provided first-hand knowledge of the injuries and 
probability of survival of a human being, concentrating on a 
child weighing approximately 75 lbs. 
Shot three. The EHS charges were all chosen randomly 
from the lot, transferred to the range and detonated on steel 
plates. For the lot to pass certification, all three of the shots 
must penetrate the plates, which all three did. 
Conclusion
For those in attendance of OSU and Golden West’s collab-
orative training opportunity, the experience taught valuable 
lessons that participants took back to their respective fields. 
For those in attendance, the experience was one-of-a-kind. 
It is the authors’ hope that Golden West can host additional 
courses so that other military members, civilian bomb squads, 
and medical personnel also can benefit. The world we live in, 
which is full of unpredictable regimes, volatile situations, and 
terrorist groups, only leads one to understanding the need 
for well-educated and trained people who are willing to help 
those trying to survive in formerly- and currently-contested 
areas contaminated with mines and UXO. In 2020, OSU and 
Golden West will be hosting another training course February 
24–28. For more information, please contact Tom Gersbeck at 
tom.gersbeck@okstate.edu. 
Jorge Rivero is an active duty Marine EOD 
technician. Rivero joined the EOD field in 
2011 after multiple infantry deployments 
to Iraq, Haiti, and the Middle East. After 
graduating from Naval School Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (NAVSCEOD), he de-
ployed to Afghanistan in 2013 and to 
Europe and Africa in 2015 where he 
served at Second EOD Company as a Team Member and EOD 
Team Leader. Rivero holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science 
from Arizona State University and is currently enrolled in George 
Washington University’s master’s program. 
Jorge Rivero
Gunnery Sergeant
Marines EOD Technician
Tom Gersbeck is a retired Marine EOD 
Officer, and has been an International 
Association of Bomb Technicians and 
Investigators (IABTI) member since 1991. 
Currently, Gersbeck is the Military Liaison 
and in the Oklahoma State Center for 
Improvised Explosives or IMPEX in the 
school of Forensic Science. He contin-
ues his work as a training coordinator for the Golden West 
Humanitarian Foundation. 
Tom Gersbeck, MFS
Military Liaison; Graduate Faculty Member
Oklahoma State Center for Improvised Explosives
61
JOURNAL: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2019
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION 62
Funded by the Belgian Directorate-General for Development and led by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) under the auspices of the National Mine Action Centre, Haut Commissariat National au 
Déminage (HCND) in Chad, the Odyssey2025 Project explores ways to 
accelerate land release for the local population with the combined use of 
small drones, new survey methods, and mobile data collection. Project 
partners include Mobility Robotics, Dynergie, InZentive, and Third 
Element Aviation. A practical, field-driven approach is being under-
taken together with partners in the PRODECO project, (MAG) Mines 
Advisory Group, and Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD). 
Online literature is available that discusses the pros and cons of dif-
ferent types of drone airframes, and how the mapping process takes 
place. A good starting point for further reading is the FSD Drone Portal: 
www.drones.fsd.ch; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining’s (GICHD) recently launched e-learning portal: https://gichd.
litmos.com, which provides information about how to integrate drones 
into humanitarian mine action (HMA); and the articles featured within 
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction on the use of drones 
in HMA.1–8
On 24 January 2019, the authors created the first drone cartography 
of a minefield near the village of Amoul, in the Faya-Largeau area of 
northern Chad. The goal of this first mission was to validate how drones 
can provide better situational awareness of suspected hazardous areas 
(SHA), confirmed hazardous areas (CHA), and zones clear of contami-
nation in desert conditions. This campaign is part of a broader trial to 
determine how small drones can help to accelerate the land release pro-
cess and gain operational efficiencies. The next stages include assess-
ing the effectiveness of drone data to tighten the definition of SHA/
CHA borders, indicate where land might be cancelled or reduced, and 
Drones in the Desert: Augmenting HMA and  
Socio-Economic Activities in Chad
by John Fardoulis [ Mobility Robotics ], Xavier Depreytere, Emmanuel Sauvage, and Pierre Gallien [ Humanity & Inclusion (HI) ]
achieve more targeted technical survey. Other practical benefits will 
also be explored by combining drone and HMA expertise during em-
bedded field trials.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
Where possible, the authors have tried to leverage the data capture po-
tential from relatively low-cost, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones. 
The concept of operations presented here takes COTS equipment and 
software, and combines known processes and defined indicators to gen-
erate actionable operational intelligence. Rather than try to reinvent the 
wheel, these tests strive to get better mileage from existing equipment 
and software that is already accessible to the community.
A starting point was using indicators of direct evidence listed in 
07.11(5.3) Land Release of the International Mine Action Standards, 
with signs of contamination including visual observation of explosive 
ordnance (EO) parts, craters, detonations by animals, mine signs, fenc-
ing, EO accidents, or incidents where the location of the event could be 
accurately determined. Initial indicators of an absence of contamination 
include roads in use, land used for certain types of agriculture, and foot-
prints from large animals. Work is ongoing with HI technical staff, and 
the national mine action center (MAC) to validate further direct and 
indirect indicators. The January mission trialed new equipment such as 
the first sub-1 kilogram drone with variable optical zoom: the DJI Mavic 
2 Zoom (M2Z).9 Video goggles were also tested, to determine how use-
ful a more immersive live experience would be during inspection and re-
connaissance operations. For example, an explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) specialist might want to direct the pilot to fly closer to or around 
Figure 1. The team approaches a minefield for the first consumer drone cartography flight over a confirmed hazardous area (CHA) in Chad.
All images courtesy of the authors.
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objects.10 These devices can also be useful during improvised explosive 
devices disposal (IEDD) operations.
SOFTWARE AND APPS
The cartography flight-planning process involved importing a SHA or 
CHA polygon from the MAC Information Management for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) database into a drone autopilot app before leaving for the field. 
Each MAC has a database of SHA or CHA points and polygons, collect-
ed years or decades prior. If a polygon does not exist, a flight plan cov-
ering a greater footprint than the area of interest will be programmed. 
Three different flight-planning apps were tested.11–13 Poor internet con-
nectivity was a particular challenge while working in the desert, and the 
plan needed to account for that.
DATA PROCESSING
Images from mapping flights were processed with COTS photogram-
metry software to create orthomosaic, topographic, and digital surface 
model (DSM) outputs.14 Data outputs were analyzed and post-processed 
in geographic information system (GIS) software using ESRI’s ArcMap 
application.15 Data sets were also provided to HI and MAC technical 
staff as high-resolution, offline, Google Earth layers—making GIS data 
viewable on every laptop, prompting discussions regarding how to pri-
oritize the deployment of technical survey assets.
MISSION PLANNING
Two modes of operation were used: 
• Relatively low-altitude inspection flights, remaining stationary at 
times to hover, circle, and zoom, capturing snapshots of evidence 
points during inspection and reconnaissance missions. 
• Programming mapping missions to automate data capture in a 
set way to generate cartography and topographic information.
During the first trial, the purpose of drone inspection missions was 
for planning to gather evidence for EOD specialists to make judgments 
regarding the cause of explosions at accident locations and discuss the 
probability of nearby hazards. Mapping missions were used to create an 
area overview of the entire CHA, looking for patterns and to function as 
a base map for operational planning. 
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
Human intelligence from mine action specialists is just as important 
as an ambitious data-capture strategy and can provide answers to “so 
what” questions regarding features identified in cartography and in-
spection data. For example, identifying a pattern of recent tire tracks 
across a CHA can impact operations in different ways, depending on 
interpretation. Tire tracks indicate that members of the public are driv-
ing through the CHA, which might signal a need to better mark the pe-
rimeter with warning signs, or conduct mine risk education (MRE) in 
the area, perhaps elevating the priority of technical survey or clearance 
of that site to prevent accidents. Or perhaps tire tracks hint that a por-
tion of the polygon is clear of contamination because an explosion did 
not occur when a vehicle drove through, suggesting an adjustment of 
CHA borders. This example also provides insight into how drone data 
can influence different aspects of HMA activities ranging from MRE to 
clearance. Collaborative research will continue during the length of the 
one-year project, determining which features are most useful and docu-
menting outcomes under field conditions.
GROUND SIGN INDICATORS
The true value of drone data will be determined by how it can 
augment operations on the ground: capturing evidence-points, fea-
tures of interest, patterns, man-made anomalies, or other clues that 
provide hints of what might (or might not) be under the ground. 
Moreover, by providing a better understanding of the terrain, drones 
can help identify hazards, access points, or elements that might pose 
challenges for operations.
In some cases, it will be beneficial to re-survey a SHA or CHA to gain 
additional knowledge such as patterns not visible from a ground-level 
perspective, helping target technical survey or clearance assets by di-
recting them to hot spots first. In other cases, EOD specialists might 
deem that CHA borders can be redefined. Working closely with the chief 
of ops and technical field managers (TFM) is important to align strate-
gies with the end users of drone data products.
Hence, a key objective during the first mission was to collaboratively 
develop a catalogue of ground-sign indicators and prove how using cues 
from the catalogue can influence operations on the ground. Creating a 
framework for generating valuable, actionable intelligence is central to 
process innovation. 
TEST LOCATIONS
Field tests took place in three locations, providing a mix of terrain, 
ground signs, and objects to inspect or map. The first site was a mine-
field (Figure 4 and Figure 5) where demining teams were conducting 
technical survey in a CHA. The second CHA location (Figure 3) was a 
battle area clearance site where a destroyed vehicle was carrying 122 mm 
Take-off weight 905 grams
Max flight time 25 minutes
Max range More than 2 km
Size (diagonally) 354 mm
Max Windspeed ~35 kph
DJI MAVIC 2 ZOOM
Figure 2. Small but powerful, the DJI Mavic 2 Zoom captured all the 
data in this article.
Figure 3. Cartography of the second test location shows a CHA sur-
rounded by mixed terrain and natural features such as sand dunes, 
rocky outcrops, and sparse vegetation. The resolution captured was 
approximately ten times that from civilian satellites.
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rockets. Imagery from these two post-conflict 
sites will be added to a ground-sign database to 
calibrate against in the future. The third test site 
(Figure 9) was a training location for HI’s GCS-
250 demining machine to create slope maps for 
planning mechanical operations.16 
RESULTS
GROUND-SIGN INDICATORS
In Figure 4, Images 1 and 2 show how over-
head photos of ground signs can be captured by 
an operator standing 200 meters away, outside 
of the CHA. Image 1 is evidence of a camel acci-
dent, with a blast crater next to it, and possibly a 
second crater under the animal bones. Image 2 
is evidence of a vehicle accident, with the blast 
area possibly under the left front wheel.
 Image 3 shows how cartography can help to 
join the dots between Image 1 and Image 2. If 
you draw a line in Image 3 between the two acci-
dents, it appears that they occurred along an old 
road. A pattern is visible on the ground, which 
may be weathered signs of its presence. Piecing 
all the information together suggests that the 
road may have been mined because of its stra-
tegic nature during the conflict. Or perhaps this 
man-made pattern relates more directly to the 
conflict, or subsequent post-conflict operations? 
Whatever the case, based on imagery analysis, 
more targeted technical survey is required in 
that area. 
Tests showed how inspection flights can dis-
tinguish fine details from different perspectives 
for a bigger picture, with cartography capturing 
the whole polygon (Figure 5) to look for patterns. 
The crater next to the animal accident in Figure 4, Image 3 is visible 
from a higher (cartography) flying altitude, but individual bones are dif-
ficult to see from that height. Figure 4 demonstrates how a combination 
of imagery from inspection and cartography flights can complement 
each other. Personnel can also return and inspect hot spots more closely 
if technical advisors want more information. 
EVIDENCE-BASED SURVEY
These results provide field examples of how high-resolution imagery 
and cartography can assist the HMA process. A starting point was re-
surveying CHAs currently being worked on by ground teams to identi-
fy indicators and ground truth data, calibrate resolution, quality-check 
mapping capabilities of a sub-1 kilogram drone, and gain validation 
from EOD personnel. The data also shows how several different obser-
vations can be linked together, which can increase confidence levels for 
decision making. 
SPEED
It only took a few hours on-site to capture all the raw data regarding 
the minefield, proving how fast reconnaissance and cartography data 
capture can be compared to opening technical survey lanes to examine 
hot spots. After the raw data was captured, cartography took about a day 
to process per site back at the base. 
MORE TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS
Being able to move a camera in three-dimensional space and capture 
imagery from directly above means scope for more technical interpreta-
tions of data. From the drone data, the authors determined that the size of 
the crater next to the animal bones in Figure 4 Image 1 to be 2.15 meters in 
diameter. Such information can affect planning by indicating whether the 
explosion was from an anti-personnel or anti-tank mine. 
HIGH-RESOLUTION TERRAIN MAPPING
Mapping terrain and other elements of the natural environment can 
help many aspects of HMA operations. However, the process of creat-
ing maps from drone data is more involved than the process for inspec-
tions. Thus, field validation in-country was important, e.g., proving that 
it was viable to map sand dunes. Figure 6 shows the results of a sand 
dune mapping test, with Image 1 being a high-resolution orthomosaic 
map that shows how sand dunes can be recognized visually. Image 3 of 
Figure 7 shows how a topographic map was created by post-processing a 
DSM from drone data. Although it was initially unclear, the reflectivity 
and texture of sand did not make a difference, and standard techniques 
were fine. Mapping sand dunes is of interest as they tend to move, affect-
ing access to sites by covering/uncovering contamination. 
The ability to map roads was also field-proven, which will be useful 
because demining roads is a priority in many locations.
The usefulness of being able to spot rocky outcrops, unfavorable ter-
rain, and other hazards for demining machines was validated, in asso-
ciation with the mechanical operations team (Figure 3 and Figure 9). 
Data was captured (Figure 9) to help plan how the drone and demining 
machine can work together. Figure 9 shows a slope map, indicating dif-
ferent terrain inclines at the machine training site (top right, green area). 
The idea was to identify locations where the demining machine can ex-
cel, and map out hazards in advance, so that the amount of time and money 
Figure 4. Image 1 shows an example of a ground sign indicator, an animal accident, and craters 
(red circles). The white shading shows a technical survey lane (visible in all images) that was 
opened to investigate. Image 2 shows another ground sign indicator: a vehicle accident. Image 
3 shows a consumer drone cartography output. By drawing a line between the two red circles 
in this image, one can see possible signs of an old road, which is another indicator. Note the 
technical survey lanes for access to accident spots, shaded in white.
64
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss1/1
ISSUE 23.1 @ APRIL 2019 65
spent on repairs are reduced. There are many ideas to field test across multi-
disciplinary teams next mission. 
QUALITY OF MICRO DRONE ZOOM
Results of variable optical zoom tests from the M2Z were positive, 
with sample data from 25 meter and 119 meter heights shown in Figure 
7 and Figure 8.
Original photos from the drone are shown in Figure 7 Images 1 and 3, 
and in Figure 8 Images 5 and 7. Differences that the two times zoom makes 
in object detail and image footprint can be seen in columns on the left. 
Sections of each photo were reviewed at very high magnification on 
a PC to compare fine details. For example, a difference in sharpness 
can be seen along the edges of the rocket body and in the details of the 
human footprints when comparing Figure 7 Images 2 and 4 at a 25- 
meter height. Improvements in detail and sharpness are also visible 
when comparing the zoom to standard perspective in Figure 8 Images 
6 and 8 at a 119-meter height. 
Testing also took place to review the 
quality of an additional variable two 
times digital zoom (total four times) in 
high-definition (HD) video mode, i.e., the 
ability to zoom from 24 millimeters to 96 
millimeters (equivalents). The quality was 
acceptable, and helped capture more de-
tail without having to fly closer.
One of the key findings was that up to 
four times variable zoom in HD video 
mode (two times for photos) was easy to 
operate while flying. The operator can ad-
just the zoom by moving a wheel on the 
controller, providing greater utility than 
other drones in that class. The option to 
capture a more tailored perspective while 
in flight will simplify workflow back at 
the base, negating the need for post-pro-
cessing analysis of features of interest.
The outcome from these tests was to 
validate that the M2Z as an effective tool 
with additional inspection capabilities. 
VIDEO GOGGLES
Glare can be an issue in the desert, so 
enclosing an observer’s view and placing 
the display close to his/her eyes means a 
more immersive experience, with much 
greater magnification. Several EOD specialists tried the video goggles 
as part of a combined drone/EOD team scenario, and feedback was 
positive. One of the best tests will be during EOD spot tasks next mis-
sion. A more immersive, live experience will allow a specialist observer 
to inspect evidence of hazards from a safe distance and better assess a 
site in real time. Gaining a high-quality camera view, moving in three- 
dimensional space, flying around objects, viewing from different per-
spectives/angles ranging from up-close inspection to a broad footprint 
of the area from a higher altitude, which will help save time. Searching 
a broader area around the perimeter is often faster from in the air than 
on the ground. CHAs can be several hours drive from the base, meaning 
that becoming more productive per visit will improve efficiency.
The video goggles also proved to be a useful educational tool, allow-
ing deminers to gain a birds-eye perspective, as if they were flying inside 
the drone. Dozens of people got to try.
For more information about results from the January field mission, 
including flying videos and sample data see: www.mr-au.com/chad.
Figure 5. Digitized high-resolution cartography of the complete CHA polygon from Figure 4. This was analyzed closely by technical specialists 
to discuss operational implications of features identified by the aerial intelligence.
Figure 6. Image 1 is a high-resolution optical (orthomosaic) map showing the ability to identify sand 
dunes visually. Image 2 is a ground reference photo taken of nearby sand dunes to check against 
cartography (Images 1 and 3). Image 3 is a high-resolution terrain map of sand dunes from data 
captured during the same consumer drone flight as for Image 1.
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Figure 7. Two photos taken from the M2Z at a height of 25 meters: Images 1 and 3. Image 1 is at a standard wide-angle 
perspective. Image (3) was taken at the same height but used the two times optical zoom. Image 1 and 3 show the differ-
ences between the area captured and enlarging features of interest. Image (2) is a magnified version of the standard per-
spective to compare fine detail on a computer. Image 4 is the optical zoom photo, magnified on a computer. You can see 
differences in quality in the magnified images, particularly the edges of the rocket casing and detail in human footprints.
Figure 8. Two photos, Images 5 and 7 taken at a height of 119 meters using the same methodology as above. Differences 
in the rocket casing can be seen in Images 6 and 8, plus clearer lines and sharper edges in the vehicle remains in Image 8.
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LESSONS LEARNED
The ability of small consumer quadcopter drones to remain station-
ary by hovering presents a lot of potential opportunities for inspections 
and reconnaissance, particularly when a zoom camera is included. In 
addition to traditional HMA tasks, micro models have the added value 
of being well-suited for inspections of damaged buildings in Iraq, Syria, 
and Libya, as they are used increasingly during IEDD operations, look-
ing for small objects, such as wires. Examples of inspections are shown 
in Figure 4 and Figure 7.
Most drones have a wide-angle lens as standard, which is often better 
for mapping flights. However, as the M2Z illustrated, the flexibility to 
zoom produced both acceptable mapping quality and offered improved 
results for inspection and reconnaissance. A minimum standoff dis-
tance from the ground, obstructions or possible hazards will need to be 
specified in drone standard operating procedures, meaning that zoom 
capabilities from an altitude or standoff distance of 15–30 meters will 
be useful. Being able to dynamically zoom using the M2Z is practical 
and comes at virtually no extra cost. An additional element that the au-
thors will monitor is heat dissipation, as the electronics seemed to heat 
up more while in operation than slightly larger drone alternatives. There 
are restrictions regarding the size of drones allowed to be used in HMA 
operations in some countries. Being a micro size, the sub-1 kilogram 
model fits within such restrictions. 
A lessoned learned relating to Figure 4, was that a drone is a fast recon-
naissance tool, compared to otherwise having to open technical survey 
lanes for inspecting suspected hot spots; i.e., flying in from outside the 
CHA to capture evidence points. This doesn’t negate the need for human 
assets on the ground but could help to gain better efficiency from more 
targeted technical survey. Another lesson learned was the power of being 
able to digitize site information (Figure 5). This led to greater collabora-
tion, with inspection data and cartography reviewed simultaneously; by 
TFMs, the chief of operations and the regional technical advisor.
Results from the first field campaign suggest that progress can be 
made in innovating processes, gaining synergy by blending HMA and 
drone expertise to collaboratively 
find ways of making an impact. The 
equipment and software used for this 
project were purely COTS, meaning 
that it’s all about applied usage and 
know-how.
A few operational questions arose 
along the way, such as the policy re-
garding wearing personal protective 
equipment (PPE) while operating 
near SHAs or CHAs. Project mem-
bers determined that it is up to the 
site manager (e.g., a TFM) to have the 
last say where and when PPE needs to 
be worn. 
LAND-RELEASE 
One of the foundations of land re-
lease is the non-intrusive gathering 
and checking of as much evidence as 
possible, with drones being an asset 
to help leverage or augment the value 
of other assets by providing addition-
al site-specific data. Dronts will not 
replace deminers on the ground in 
the foreseeable future, and they won’t 
replace human intelligence. What 
they can do is provide additional tar-
geted information to help gain better 
productivity from human, mechanical, and animal assets. 
Decisions regarding each site need to be made on a case-by-case ba-
sis; however, gaining confidence in indicators that better pinpoint evi-
dence will help target technical surveys and clearance, perhaps starting 
from hot spots and working outward. Ideally, discussions regarding 
fade out from hot spots inside CHAs might lead to new ideas regarding 
targeted technical survey that saves time and resources. Gaining con-
fidence in indicators that suggest the absence of contamination, most 
likely combined with other information could lead to an acceleration in 
the amount of land being cancelled or reduced. Decisions need to be risk 
and evidence-based, combining data from various sources, and include 
both ground and aerial assets, as an area may not be deemed hazard-free 
purely based on no visible signs.
HUMANS IN HMA
Removing explosive hazards is important, but the process of doing so 
can be slow and expensive. Being embedded in remote demining opera-
tions meant ties to the community. Meeting local villagers and repre-
sentatives from the regional government helped teach project members 
about the needs of the local population, who are the actual beneficia-
ries of HMA work. What do they believe is most important? The road or 
shortcuts linking the north to N’Djamena?
BEYOND RESEARCH 
Even though there are research components, the scope of this proj-
ect extends further because an operational framework for drone usage 
needs to be implemented. Together with the HCND, HI and Mobility 
Robotics are launching humanitarian drone operations in Chad for 
the first time. There are no formal regulations regarding drone us-
age, meaning that approvals are required from multiple ministries/au-
thorities, including the Ministry of Defense and Aviation Authority. 
Importing equipment can be a challenge, and delays in customs clear-
ance are not uncommon. 
Building capacity by training pilots is another goal, as recruiting the 
right candidates improves sustainability once the Odyssey2025 project 
Figure 9. Shown is an example of a customized consumer drone demining machine operations map in-
dicating the slope of terrain. It can be taken into the field electronically, or as a laminated hard copy. 
As most demining machines have a limit regarding the gradient at which they can work, slope maps can 
help operational planning.
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concludes. Dront equipment has been selected to provide local teams 
with field kits that are fit for purpose. Information technology equip-
ment is being procured, including powerful laptop computers, a desktop 
processing workstation, and archival-storage system to handle the large 
volume of data generated. These must be located at the base in northern 
Chad, as self-sufficiency is required due to poor internet connectivity. 
Workshops will be held for government ministries and other humani-
tarian organizations in Chad to prompt thoughts regarding drone po-
tential in other areas.
Logistics are also important. For safety, a minimum of two vehicles 
must travel together when venturing into the Sahara Desert, with a med-
ic often required as a precaution. If multiple drone teams are deploying 
simultaneously to five locations, they require ten off-road vehicles, 10 
drivers, five medics, five pilots, five observers, and sharing the resource 
of a technical specialist, such as a TFM. Such elements may affect the 
scalability of drone operations.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Results from the desert field trial helped to establish proof that, when 
tailored effectively, imagery can help augment other assets and suggest 
ways to gain operational efficiencies. Two modes of operation were es-
tablished: inspection and cartography. Work will continue to increase 
the depth and breadth of the ground-sign catalogue, and field test the 
validity of each indicator. 
Time and resources permitting, a satellite data study may take place, 
conducting a trade-off analysis using drone data for calibration to 
ground-truth space data.
During the next two field campaigns, a number of different categories 
of drones and sensors will be tested in a desert environment, with capa-
bilities matched to mission objectives. 
Ideally, enough sample data sets will be captured from in the field to 
use as a proof of concept for future initiatives utilizing artificial intelli-
gence, deep learning and machine vision techniques for automated anal-
ysis. Lessons learned will be shared through in-depth case studies.
Capacity-building will commence during the next mission, providing 
equipment, teaching Chadian pilots how to operate drones and about the 
processes required to convert data into actionable intelligence. 
See endnotes page 71
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Ukraine’s Newly Adopted Mine Action Law: What Does This Mean for MA Programs? by Garbino [ from page 13 ]
1. Anna Rich and Martin Oubrecht, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” UNDP, Protection Cluster Ukraine, February 2018, https://bit.ly/2U87yRl. 
2. According to the Protection Cluster and based on the Danish Demining Group (DDG)’s assessments, the number of mine and ERW victims is approximately 1,600. The Landmine & 
Cluster Munition Monitor, however, places the figures as high as 3,600 (Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, ‘Ukraine Casualties Report (2017)’. Geneva, Switzerland: International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition, 2017).
3. Mine Action Review, ‘Clearing the Mines: Ukraine (2016)’ (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian People’s Aid, 2017).
4. Humanitarian Mine Action expert based in Ukraine, interview by Henrique Garbino, face-to-face, 22 August 2018.
5. According to the Head of the Coordinating Group for Mine Action, the main national mine action operators are the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), the State Special Transport Service 
(SSTS), now under control of the Ministry of Defense, and the State Emergencies Services of Ukraine. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (through the National Police and National Guard), 
the Security Service, and the State Border Service also have some responsibility in related topics, such as improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) and investigation of criminal offens-
es involving explosive ordnance. In addition, since 2016, three international NGOs have started operating in the country. The HALO Trust, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), 
and the Danish Demining Group operate under individual memorandums of understanding with the Ministry of Defense and are tasked by its Coordinating Group for Mine Action. 
Ukrainian commercial companies, such as the state-owned Ukroboronservice, the Demining Team of Ukraine (DTU) and the newly established Demining Solutions (DS), are increasing 
their capacity, but, as of January 2019, are not known to be conducting clearance operations in Ukraine. The Demining Team of Ukraine, however, has carried out non-technical survey 
(August–September) and mine risk education (May–June) on government-controlled areas in Luhansk Oblast since 2018.
6. The HALO Trust, “Mine & ERW casualties,” May 2014-September 2018, UTM/Datum WGS 84, 20 September 2018.
7. Eric Filippino, “A Study of the Development of National Mine Action Legislation,” Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, November 2004.
8. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines,” Information Kit, Geneva, 
Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1 January 2012.
9. Lou Maresca and Jack Glattbach, “Developing Mine Action Legislation: A Guide,” Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, August 2003.
10. Helga Pender, Program Manager, Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, asserts the lack of national mine action legislation did 
not prevent the European Union from funding actions on the ground, but she acknowledges that those actions would have more impact if the necessary legislation was in place.
11. Mine and ERW casualties are usually recorded by different actors depending on the consequence of the accident. For instance, if the victim has died, the accident will likely be managed 
by the police, whereas if the victim survives, the Ministry of Health will be involved.
12. Ukrainian Independent Information Agency, “Ukraine’s mine action bill passes first reading,” UNIAN, 6 November 2018.  https://bit.ly/2Z085bG.
13. Anthony Connell, Program Manager, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action in Ukraine, interview by Henrique Garbino, e-mail exchange, 30 November 2018.
14. According to Gianluca Maspoli, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), in partnership with OSCE PCU and the Geneva Center for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), has supported the effort to develop a specific mine action law and NMAS. Other United Nations agencies and international NGOs, such as FSD, HALO 
Trust and DDG, have also contributed to the process by providing comments to the drafts and participating in several workshops to discuss the topic.
15. Gianluca Maspoli, Policy Advisor, Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, interview by Henrique Garbino, via Skype, 20 August 2018.
16. Foreign diplomat based in Kiev, interview by Henrique Garbino, e-mail exchange, 11 September 2018.
17. Information Department of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Secretariat, “Laws, bills and resolutions passed,” Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Official Web Portal, 6 December 2018.  https://
bit.ly/2YVbFUq.
18. Information Department of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Secretariat, “First vice-speaker sets mine action among this plenary week’s priorities,” Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Official 
Web Portal, 6 December 2018.  https://bit.ly/2P6h32I.
19. Danish Demining Group, “DRC/DDG Legal Alert: Mine Action Law,” Issue 35, January 2019.
20. Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, “Ukraine Mine Action Report (2014)” Geneva, Switzerland: International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition, 2014.
21. Sergiy Prokhorov, Communication for Development Officer, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Ukraine, interview by Henrique Garbino, face-to-face, 10 August 2018.
22. Miljenko Vahtaric, Technical Adviser on Humanitarian Mine Action, Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU), interview by 
Henrique Garbino, e-mail exchange, 8 October 2018.
23. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On mine action in Ukraine: This law determines legal and organizational principles to perform mine action activities in Ukraine, and determines specific 
features of state regulation in the corresponding sphere,” 2019.
24. Yuri Shahramanyan, Program Manager, The HALO Trust in Ukraine, interview by Henrique Garbino, face-to-face, 23 August 2018.
25. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Head of the Coordinating Group for Mine Action, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, interview by Henrique Garbino, face-to-face, 8 August 2018.
26. Anthony Connell, Program Manager, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action in Ukraine, interview by Henrique Garbino, face-to-face, 3 August 2018.
27. Both the MOD and SESU currently consider the whole of the buffer zone as a suspected hazardous area, that is, the roughly 15-kilometer (9.32-mile) wide and 500-kilometer (310.69-mile) 
long strip along the contact line totaling about 7,000 sq km (2702.72 sq mi). To put in perspective, more conservative estimates made by the international operators in Ukraine amount to 
an area of 15 to 20 sq km (5.79 to 7.72 sq mi). In addition, government authorities also include cancelled and reduced areas when counting the extension of clearance tasks, and mines and 
ammunition disposed of during stockpile destruction as destroyed mines and ERWs, which amount to the impressive figure of 27.7 sq km (10.70 sq mi) of cleared land and about 370,000 
destroyed mines and ERWs since 2014.
28. Helga Pender interview by Henrique Garbino, e-mail exchange, 17 September 2018.
29. Tymur Pistriuha, Executive Director, Demining Solutions, and Head of the Association of Ukrainian Defence Manufacturers’ Mine Action Cluster, interview by Henrique Garbino, face-
to-face, 10 August 2018.
30. Judith Gough, UK Ambassador to Ukraine; Roman Waschuk, Canadian Ambassador to Ukraine; Maria L. Yovanovitch, US Ambassador to Ukraine; Hermine Poppeller, Austrian 
Ambassador to Ukraine; Ernst Reichel, German Ambassador to Ukraine; Davide La Cecilia, Italian Ambassador to Ukraine; Ole T. Horpestad, Norwegian Ambassador to Ukraine; 
Marek Šafin, Slovakian Ambassador to Ukraine; Isabelle Dumont, French Ambassador to Ukraine; Ed Hoeks, Dutch Ambassador to Ukraine; Hugues Mingarelli, Head of the EU 
Delegation to Ukraine; and Mateja Kračun, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia to Ukraine; “Letter dated 1 February 2019 from the heads of mission of the 
mine action donor community addressed to Mr. Andriy Parubiy, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada,” 1 February 2019.
31. Matthew Wilson, Head of Operations, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, e-mail exchange, 22 February 2019.
32. Henry Leach, Head of Program, Danish Demining Group in Ukraine, interview by Henrique Garbino, face-to-face, 22 August 2018.
The Challenges of Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Ukraine by Robinson and O’Keeffe [ from page 17 ]
1. “Request for an Extension of the Deadline for Completing the Destruction of Anti-personnel Mines in Accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” AP Mine Ban Convention, https://
bit.ly/2VUV94m. Accessed 12 February 2019.
Contamination in Eastern Ukraine: Observations by OSCE SMM by Crowther [ from page 24 ]
1. “Spot Report: One SMM patrol member dead, two taken to hospital after vehicle hits possible mine near Pryshyb,” OSCE, 23 April 2017, https://bit.ly/2HZ5v0n. 
2. Editor’s note: The OSCE SMM uses preferred language to refer to the parties to the conflict. The term sides is the approved language of the organization and is used by the OSCE SMM 
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in its daily reports. 
3. Editor’s note: Armed formations is the approved language of the OSCE SMM to refer to the non-government forces.
4. “Ukraine, Anti-Personnel Mines,” Mine Action Review, accessed 4 April 2019, https://bit.ly/2K8TZBB. 
5. Nick Torbet and Patrick Thompson, “21st Century Survey in Eastern Ukraine and the Use of Technology in Insecure Environments,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
21, no 2 (July 2017): 20–27, https://bit.ly/2D5x588.
6. This article acknowledges the updated IMAS definition of ‘ATM/AVM’ adopted on 27th July 2018, but for the sake of brevity will utilize only AVM.
7. “Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 19 March 2019,” OSCE, 20 March 2019, https://bit.ly/2OdoRis. 
8. “Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 24 February 2019,” OSCE, 25 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2GYn8fw. 
9. “Наші військові замінували узбережжя Маріуполя,” YouTube video, 15 December 2014, https://bit.ly/2VlJkVh. 
10. “Ukraine,” Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, https://bit.ly/2Ud4NmC. 
11. “Spot Report by OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Explosion 100m from SMM near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge,” OSCE, 15 September 2016, https://bit.ly/2cWZS4y. 
12. “Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 February 2017,” OSCE, 9 February 2017, https://bit.ly/2kqwQt7. 
13. “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 6 December 2015,” OSCE 7 December 2015, https://bit.ly/1Tw5Y5G. 
14. “‘СЬОГОДНІ МИ ВРЯТУВАЛИ 14 ЖИТТІВ...’ - ВІЙСЬКОВИЙ САПЕР,” YouTube video, 0:1429 July 2018, https://bit.ly/2UgCYKf.  
15. “A Rocket’s Tale,” OSCE, 8 November 2016, https://bit.ly/2IcLpPG. 
16. “Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 March 2017,” OSCE, 8 March 2017, https://bit.ly/2YPAqBu.   
Mineland: The Endless War by Rorandelli [ from page 27 ]
1. Evelyn Nieves. “The ‘Endless War’ of Land Mines in the Balkans.” The New York Times. 4 April 2018.
2. “Croatia.” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. Last modified 5 November 2018. https://bit.ly/2X03ci2.
3. “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. Last modified 7 November 2018. https://bit.ly/2BuK7v6.
4. “Kosovo.” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. Last modified 19 November 2018. https://bit.ly/2Sr2DiD.
5. “Serbia.” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. Last modified 3 November 2018.  https://bit.ly/2GmyHOa.
ITF Enhancing Human Security in Serbia by Sancˇanin [ from page 37 ]
1. Slovenia based and established as International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) in March 1998, and since January 2012 operating under the new name ITF 
Enhancing Human Security.
2. SFRY also introduced two administrative autonomous provinces within Serbia, namely Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo (and Metohija) in the south, largely autonomous but as inte-
gral parts of Serbia.
3. Without consent and boycott by the majority of Serbian ethnic population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
4. Kosovo being an integral part of Serbia.
5. Serbia recognized in UN with its full territorial scale, Kosovo being subject to UN SCR 1244. 
6. As a consequence of 1999 NATO bombing campaign. 
7. The territoty of Kosovo / Kosovo and Metohija is herein not included, as it is not under current authority of Mine Action Centre of Serbia; further related to UN SC Resolution 1244; and 
not taking into consideration any unilaterally or bilaterally concluded documents or agreements.
8. For problematics of other unexploded ordnance on land and in rivers, as well as air-bombs/rockets, see general problem descriptions at http://www.czrs.gov.rs/eng/minska-situacija.php 
9. In the aftermath of NATO military intervention, on 10 June 1999 UN SC adopted Resolution 1244 according to which the Kosovo (and Metohija) is governed by the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, and vouching Serbia’s territorial integrity. The Assembly of Kosovo adopted the unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. 
Serbia rejects this independence and claims Kosovo (and Metohija) as its integral and indivisible part of territory according to Serbia’s Constitution. Therefore, all references within this 
article shall be without any prejudice to positions on status. 
10. not including here the territory of Kosovo (and Metohija).
11. During the bombing NATO forces used the following cluster bombs: RBL-755, CBU-87, CBU-99, AGM – 154/A and BL-755 which contained 145-247 pieces of cluster munitions type MK-
1, MK-4, MK-118, BLU-97A and BLU-97A/B. http://www.czrs.gov.rs/eng/minska-situacija.php 
12. For the projects by/through ITF Enhancing Human Security, the USA, Norway, Germany, Republic of Ireland, Czech Republic, Serbia/Ministry of Capital Investments, provided funding.
13. Listing the municipalities where the projects were executed by and through ITF. 
14. Source http://www.czrs.gov.rs/eng/minska-situacija.php
15. Still cluster bomb affected, the Niš city residential area of Medoševac is planned to be cleared only as late as in 2019. 
16. Still the remaining cluster bom affected Kopaonik area of Pančićev vrh is planned to be cleared only ias late n 2019.
17. Due to its valuable ecosystem, Kopaonik became a national park in 1981. Kopaonik National Park covers an area of 11,810 hectares and based on the number of endemic species, it is one 
of Serbia’s most important biodiversity hotspots for endemic flora. http://www.kopaonik.rs/kopaonik-mountain-resort/
18. Source http://www.czrs.gov.rs/eng/minska-situacija.php 
19. For demining of this area, ITF provided funds from donations of the USA, Spain, Germany, Norway, Canada, Czech Republic and EU for implementation of 43 projects, while one project 
was funded by the Building Directorate of Serbia. http://www.czrs.gov.rs/eng/minska-situacija.php 
20. 43 mine-clearance projects executed in Serbia (Šid) were performed by donor funds through ITF, clearing over 5.7 square kilometers (2.2 square miles) of land and removing 4,464 mines 
and 646 pieces of UXO.
21. Stockpiles of AP mines were destroyed in May 2007. Anti-personnel mines are no longer produced in Serbia. http://www.czrs.gov.rs/eng/minska-situacija.php 
22. Mine-contamination also obstructed effective border police activities on borderlines with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
23. North of/along the administrative line with Kosovo and Metohija. For the non-biased and fair treatment, the term Kosovo (and Metohija) is used purely as a geographical definition.  
24. ITF providing donor funding for the NPA’s survey project implementation.
25. The so-called groups of mines as defined by MACS, presumably set up by the Albanian paramilitary groups. 
26. Survey by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in cooperation with ITF, MACS. http://www.czrs.gov.rs/eng/minska-situacija.php
27. https://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/serbia/ 
28. In its transparency report submitted in 27 December 2006, Serbia reported that it had completed the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines. In total, Serbia reported having 
destroyed 1,404,819 mines. https://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/serbia/ 
29. Held from 28 to 30 November 2018.
30. https://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/serbia/ 
31. http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/serbia/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx 
32. Serbia donated its own funds also in 2006.
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Lessons from the Past: Minefield Clearance and Casualties – Holland 1945 – Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 by Evans [ from page 40 ] 
1. Major Maskell and Major H.C Clayton, Canadian Field Research Section 01. Report.67 quoted in TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. 
Minefield Clearance and Casualties. p.5
2. See Evans, Roly (2018) “Lessons from the Past: The Rapid Clearance of Denmark’s Minefields in 1945,” Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction: Vol. 22 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. Available 
at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss1/4
3. TNA PRO: WO 205/1186. Report on Mineclearance in the Netherlands, 01 November 1945. Recording Methods and Organisation. p.3
4. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.11 See also Antoon Meijers, Achtung Minen - Danger 
Mines, Het ruimen van landmijnen in Nederland 1940-1947 (Soesterberg, 2013), pp. 138-139
5. Antoon Meijers, Achtung Minen - Danger Mines, Het ruimen van landmijnen in Nederland 1940-1947 (Soesterberg, 2013), pp. 95-103
6. Antoon Meijers, Achtung Minen - Danger Mines, Het ruimen van landmijnen in Nederland 1940-1947 (Soesterberg, 2013), p.182. See also email from Antoon Meijers to the author, 22 
February 2019.
7. Original records found in the Minefield Records Office. Stichting Geschiedkundige Verzameling EOD, Soesterberg.
8. TNA PRO: WO 205/1186. Report on Mineclearance in the Netherlands, 01 November 1945. Recording Methods and Organisation. p.9
9. Antoon Meijers, Achtung Minen - Danger Mines, Het ruimen van landmijnen in Nederland 1940-1947 (Soesterberg, 2013), p.10
10. TNA PRO: WO 205/1186. Report on Mineclearance in the Netherlands, 01 November 1945. Recording Methods and Organisation. p.9
11. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.12
12. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.10 and Appendix C p.45
13. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.12
14. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.15
15. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. pp.17-18
16. CPG/1107/2016. Demining Programme Office in the Falkland Islands – Exploitation 2017. Fenix Insight Ltd. January 2017. Annex C. p.C-2
17. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. pp.21-22
18. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. Appendices D-H
19. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.24
20. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.7
21. TNA PRO: WO 205/1186. Report on Mineclearance in the Netherlands, 01 November 1945. Recording Methods and Organisation. Appendix I.
22. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.11
23. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. Table 8. p.22
24. TNA PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and Casualties. p.8 See also TNA PRO: WO 205/1186. Report on Mineclearance 
in the Netherlands, 01 November 1945. Recording Methods and Organisation. p.5
25. Animal detection systems – Principles, requirements and Guidelines. International Mine Action Standards 09.40. Third Edition. July 2018.
26. Email from Antoon Meijers to the author, 05 April 2019.
Accidents and Field Medical Provision by Smith [ from page 47 ]
The reports of the accidents listed below can all be found in the JMU repository at https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-dda/
1. The stretcher shown in the photograph was used to carry mines to the demolition area. It was not the stretcher issued to the medic.  
2. The study was conducted for U.S. Army CECOM NVESD by the author in 1999.
3. DDASaccident406. https://bit.ly/2IrAyl5. 
4. DDASAccident376. https://bit.ly/2GadgP6. 
5. DDASaccident747. https://bit.ly/2P0rt3F. 
6. DDASaccident421. https://bit.ly/2G9AhS9. 
7. DDASaccident482. https://bit.ly/2UDVewB. 
Drones in the Desert: Augmenting HMA & Socio-Economic Activities in Chad by Fardoulis, Depreytere, Sauvage, and Gallien [ from page 62 ]
1. M. Bajic, T. Ivelja, E. Hadzic, A. Balta, and G. Skelac, “Impact of Flooding on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction 19, no. 1 (May 2015): 43–49,  https://bit.ly/2Iqk2Sk.
2. J. S. Fardoulis, D. A. Smith, O. D. Payton, T. B. Scott, J. E. Freer, and J. C. C. Day, “Deploying Low Cost, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems in Humanitarian Mine Action,” Mine Action 
Symposium, 2017, https://bit.ly/2X1YX4G.
3. A. Smith, “Using Small Unmanned Aircraft (SUA) in HMA,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 23, no. 1 (November 2017): 46–48, https://bit.ly/2UQ8iPi.
4. B. Alford, E. Curran, and S. Cole, “Determining the Value of UAVs in Iraq,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 22, no.1 (2018): 51–54, https://bit.ly/2Z1McZE.
5. J. Fardoulis, S. Kay, A. Alzoubi, N. Aouf, and R. Irshad, “Robotics and Remote Sensing for Humanitarian Mine Action & ERW Survey,” Mine Action Symposium 2018, 2018, https://bit.
ly/2KPCUZR.
6. S. Fahs and G. Crowther, “The Added Value of Integrating UAVS Into the HMA Toolkit,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 22, no. 3 (November 2018): 10–14, https://bit.
ly/2P0HYNf.
7. I. Cruz, L. Jaupi, S. K. N. Sequesseque, and O. Cottray, “Enhancing Humanitarian Mine Action in Angola with High-Resolution UAS IM,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction 22, no. 3 (November 2018): 15–24, https://bit.ly/2Gh7bka.
8. O. Gerard-Pearse, “Drones Supporting Mine Clearance in Northern Sri Lanka,” Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 22, no.3 (November 2018): 25–30, https://bit.ly/2SMBKpz.
9. DJI Innovations, “Mavic 2 Zoom - See the Bigger Picture – DJI,” accessed 27 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2uZ3LM9.
10. DJI Innovations, “DJI Goggles Racing Edition – FPV Racing – DJI,” accessed 27 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2KnjMpv.
11. DroneDeploy, “Mobile App for Drone Flight &amp; Mapping | DroneDeploy,”  accessed 27 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2QFUW79.
12. DJI Innovations, “DJI GS Pro - Manage Drone Operations on Your iPad - DJI,” accessed 27 February 2019, https://bit.ly/2IrgfUS.
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Smoke billows skyward as homes and buildings are shelled in the city of Homs, Syria.
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Middle East
With a long list of modern conﬂ icts, the Middle East continues to experience insecurity as well as 
numerous explosive hazards. The Iraq War; civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen; the rise and fall 
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and multiple insurgencies all contributed to regional 
instability and extensive explosive contamination. How are organizations adapting to the challenge 
of working in such complex and dangerous environments? How have clearance operations adapted 
to the unique urban environments in the Middle East? Is clearance by 2025 an achievable objective in 
this region?  What lessons that have worked in this region can be shared with the wider community? 
Contributions on Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and the following are encouraged:  
 » Mosul
It will take more than a decade to clear the unexploded ordnance contaminating the Iraqi city that 
was controlled by ISIS for three years. What have been the unique challenges and lessons learned 
from Mosul? In the future, how can these be applied to other areas of urban clearance, such as in 
Syria? Discussion of the challenges encountered as well as successes in clearing critical infrastruc-
ture (hospitals, schools, bridges), risk education for the local population, and training of local law 
enforcement and the military is encouraged. 
 » Yemen
Although the ongoing civil war between Houthi and Sunni tribes currently occurring in Yemen is 
producing new suspected hazardous areas, landmines have existed in the region for years. Insur-
gent activities and civil conﬂ icts between the north and south have resulted in widespread con-
tamination from landmines and cluster munitions. How are organizations mitigating the risks 
these explosives pose to civilians and what kind of clearance activities are being conducted? Are 
mine risk education programs eﬀ ective at limiting casualties? What types of explosive hazards are 
organizations encountering and what techniques are being used to defeat improvised landmines 
created in domestic workshops?
Afghanistan
As one of the most mined countries in the world, how are organizations working in Afghanistan 
countering legacy landmines and the removal of improvised explosive devices (IED), while incorpo-
rating community awareness and risk education into clearance operations? How are organizations 
adapting to clearance requirements in urban environments? What lessons can be learned from this 
region and applied to current conﬂ ict zones such as Syria? Discussion of current clearance programs 
is encouraged. 
Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition
Unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS) worldwide, as well as the ongoing illicit proliferation of 
ammunition due to poor physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) practices at arms depots, 
highlight the need for increased international cooperation to combat these threats. Is more widespread 
application of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) the solution? What can be done 
to make the IATG more user-friendly and applicable for States with limited resources and training? And 
how can organizations that conduct safe and secure management of ammunition translate their expe-
riences into lessons learned that serve the broader community? What eﬀ orts are organizations making 
in places like Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world to prevent UEMS and monitor potential risks?
Distinguishing Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments
Ambiguously referred to as “the gray zone,” the existential diﬀ erences between conﬂ ict and 
post-conﬂ ict are becoming increasingly blurred. The situation in Mosul has demonstrated the need for 
international clearance teams to begin operations despite ongoing operations by international armed 
forces. In areas where humanitarian access is possible, how do organizations determine whether explo-
sive hazards are active or not? To what degree are humanitarian organizations responding to clearance 
requests normally reserved for military units?
Research and Development
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction seeks research and development (R&D) articles. All 
technical articles on current equipment, technology, trends, and developments in the ﬁ eld of mine 
action and CWD will be considered. Commercial companies, NGO’s, and researchers are encouraged 
to submit. R&D articles are submitted to three experts for anonymous peer review. Two of the three 
reviewers must approve the article for publication. Reviewers approve articles for publication, suggest 
revisions or reject articles for publication.
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